Kashmir Dispute: U.S. Ambassador in India to U.S. Secretary State, November 3, 1947

845.00/11-347  Telegram

The [US] Ambassador in India (Grady) to the [US] Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL - NEW DELHI, November 3,1947-noon.

         1009. Bajpai yesterday advised me as follows regarding Kashmir: some things he said were later covered in Nehru's radio address reported mytel 1004, November 3.

         In attempting [to] arrange conference between two Governors General and Prime Ministers at Lahore, Mountbatten found Jinnah very difficult. Jinnah said he had no confidence in Government of India. Perhaps Mountbatten should not have communicated this to [the] GOI, but he stated it to [the] GOI Defense Commission. Despite this, Nehru was prepared to go to Lahore until he read Jinnah's statement accusing [the] GOI of "fraud" in connection with [the] accession of Kashmir. Mountbatten is continuing negotiations with Jinnah. Jinnah first proposed that if Indian troops [are] withdrawn from Kashmir, invaders would withdraw. This, in [the] opinion of [the] GOI, indicated control by Pakistan over invaders who Bajpai said have looted and destroyed at least 100 villages on [the] border. [The] GOI countered this proposal by promising to withdraw troops if invaders first withdrew and proposed plebiscite or referendum under UN auspices. They had in mind observation similar to that which British, French, and Americans conducted last year in Greece. They are awaiting Jinnah's reply to this proposal.

         Bajpai stated [the] military situation as far as [the] GOI forces are concerned seemed "under control".
He mentioned [a] deep concern [that the] GOI naturally has for Kashmir and referred to [its] three neighbors on [the] north - China, Afghanistan and [the] USSR. [The] GOI [was] not concerned about [the] first two, but [was] definitely concerned about [the] last if Kashmir becomes [the] center of real conflict and chaos gets deeper. He observed specifically that [the] Prime Minister [was] concerned with regard to [the] USSR.
When invasion first began, Nehru wired Attlee urging him [to] request [that] Pakistan exert its influence on tribesmen to withdraw. Attlee's reply [was] in [the] form of [a] general admonition that two Dominions should preserve peace. [The] GOI felt his message patronizing and failed to appreciate [the] position of [the] GOI and [the] necessity it was under to respond to [an] appeal of a friendly neighbor for assistance when it was under attack. Nehru replied to Attlee at great length, outlining [the] whole situation as [the] GOI sees it. [The] GOI does not like what it regards as lecturing from London, and feels HMG is taking its friendliness and good will for granted while it woos Pakistan. Bajpai promised [to] keep me fully informed particularly with respect Jinnah's response to [the] GOI's latest proposal.

        Sent Department 1009, repeated Karachi 84.

        Please repeat London.

        GRADY

From: US Department of State.  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947.  Volume III.  Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972, 180-181.