Kashmir Dispute: U.S. Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy in India, December 26, 1947

745.45F/12-2447  Telegram

The Acting [US] Secretary of State to the [US] Embassy in India

SECRET - WASHINGTON, December 26, 1947-8 p.m.

         [The] Dept [is] seriously concerned [with the] turn [the] Kashmir situation has taken as indicated urtel 1151 Dec 24.

        [On] Nov 12 Mrs. Pandit approached Dept. officials [in] New York re [the] Kashmir situation stating she was doing so at [the] instance [of] Nehru. She expressed India's desire for [a] Kashmir plebiscite on [the] basis adult suffrage to be held next spring under UN supervision. She mentioned [a] plan under which India and Pakistan would agree beforehand [to] take [the] case [to the] SC with [a] joint request that [a] commission of small and disinterested countries be sent [to] supervise and observe Kashmir elections and definitely indicated [the] desire that Great Powers including [the] USSR [are] not [to] participate in plebiscite commission.

         [The] Question [of the] UN plebiscite [was] also discussed informally with GOP Amb Ispahani [in] New York, who stated that although he was without instructions, he seemed favorably disposed toward such [a] solution [to the] Kashmir problem.

        Subsequently, [the] Dept noted that although London reported (6270 Dec 1) [a] UN approach unlikely, Mountbatten was endeavoring (Delhi's 1119 Dec 12) [to] persuade [the] GOI and GOP [to] agree [to an] appointment [of] UN intermediaries including [the] US.

        Obviously [the] best solution [to the] Kashmir problem would be [an] amicable agreement among Kashmir authorities [of the] GOI and GOP. Failing that, it would be hoped parties to dispute would follow [in] letter and spirit [to the] Art 33 UN Charter, which enjoins recourse negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, etc., before reference [to the] UN. [The] Dept. [was] not informed [on] reasons why recent Lahore talks on Kashmir failed, but it appears from your 1147 Dec 23 and particularly your 1151 Dec 24 direct settlement among parties concerned [is] highly doubtful.

        If Bajpai envisages recourse [for the] UN along lines Mrs. Pandit indicated Nov 12, one possible procedure would be that [the] GOI and GOP should each choose one or two UN Govts., not necessarily [a] member [of the] SC, the two or four Govts. chosen to select an additional Govt. to comprise [a] plebiscite commission. Obviously, this type [of] approach to [the] SC would be more effective if made jointly by [the] GOI and GOP as suggested by Mrs Pandit, but [it is] conceivable that [the] GOI could unilaterally make such proposal to [the] SC. [The] Dept. believes [the] SC [to be] technically competent [to] authorize [the] establishment [of] such [a] plebiscite commission under its auspices.

        View foregoing, Delhi requested informally [to] convey [to the] GOI [that the] US regret[s] [the] breakdown [of the] Lahore talks, [and wishes to] ascertain reasons for breakdown and present GOI plans for future Kashmir status; and inquire whether, in event [of] recourse [of the] UN, plan along above lines for plebiscite [the] SC auspices would be followed. [The] US [was] concerned lest recourse by India, to UN without some such prearranged plan, might lead to unnecessary complications and crystallize pattern[s] [of] GOI-GOP hostility.

        Karachi requested likewise [to] discuss [the] Kashmir situation with [the] GOP informally without divulging contents [of] Delhi's 1151 and primarily with view ascertaining GOP reaction to plebiscite plan outlined above.

        London should report Brit[ish] views which will be taken into account in final determination [of the] US position.

        Sent New Delhi repeated Karachi 218 and London 5368.

        LOVETT

From: US Department of State.  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947.  Volume III.  Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972, 184-185.