Kashmir Dispute: U.S. Chargé in the United Kingdom to U.S. Secretary of State, December 29, 1947

745.45F/12-2947  Telegram

The [US] Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the [US] Secretary of State

SECRET - LONDON, December 29, 1947-8 p.m.

        (1) Patrick CRO described December 22 GOI note to GOP (Delhi's 1151, December 24 to Department, repeated Karachi 99) as "ultimatum" seriousness [of] which can hardly be exaggerated. There is ample reason in his view to fear GOI attack on Pakistan simultaneously with filing [the] GOI complaint with [the] SC. Attlee and ministers are now formulating HMG policy re various eventualities.

        (2) Patrick said CRO is without full account [of] two meetings re Kashmir but he understands [the] first talk failed because [the] GOP, while denying GOI charges, claimed it could not stop transit raiders. [The] December 22 talk failed because in [the] GOI note, GOP was faced with ultimatum. Patrick understands [the] GOP was willing to make [a] joint approach to [the] UN re [the] broader problem [of] long-term settlements [in] Kashmir and Junagadh. [The] GOP could not accept [this] approach to UN on [the] narrow question [of] Pakistan['s] complicity [re] raiders. When [the] GOI announced its intention to approach [the] UN, GOP announced that it would file [a] rejoinder with [the] UN. This may be done December 30, because [the] ultimatum expires today.

        (3) Patrick sees [the] problem [of] GOI-GOP relations as failing into two phases: First is finding UN means to stop [the] conflict which may begin within [the] next few days by [a] GOI attack towards Lahore; second is finding [a] way to decide long-term fate, Kashmir by plebiscite, or some other means {Department's 5368, December 26). [The] Latter may take time because plebiscite could not begin until May, and if carried out on [the] basis [of] adult suffrage, [it] would require about eight months to complete. Preparatory to plebiscite, peaceful conditions would have to be established in Kashmir under UN auspices. This might mean, since British troops would not be available, and since [the] SC has no force at its disposal, [a] decision whereby both GOI and GOP troops would be supplied for pacification [of] Kashmir under [a] commander appointed by [the] SC. If and when conditions favorable for plebiscite are established, Patrick thought some arrangement comparable to that suggested [in] Paragraph 6, Department's reference telegram might be worked out. As minor point, he doubted that [the] GOI, which considers itself in possession Kashmir, would unilaterally propose plebiscite to SC.

        (4) Some concession by [the] GOP to GOI might relieve tension but Liaquat has made it plain that tribesmen regard Kashmir operations as Jihad and are largely beyond GOP control. [The] GOI, on other hand, is driven to its rash course by Nehru's "Brahmin logic" which argues that now Kashmir has adhered to [the] GOI, it is part [of] India and consequently [the] GOP is interfering with steps by [the] GOI to put down rebels in GOI territory. As further factor, Sikhs might get out of control and force GOI-GOP struggle.

        (5) If fight starts, Nehru will demand immediately and obtain withdrawl of British officers from [the] Pakistan Army, thus crippling it. Patrick said "we will withdraw British officers as quickly as possible from both sides."

        (6) Although [the] Pakistan Army is much smaller than [the] Indian Army, [the] latter is so extended [in] Kashmir, that initially Pakistan would not be overwhelmed. In event [of] conflict, Patrick believes Afghanistan would make [a] deal with [the] GOP and become [a] GOP ally. "Because more trouble would be created that way," Patrick thinks [the] USSR would probably take [the] Pakistan side.

        (7) Patrick said he could not advise [the] Embassy re course HMG plans to take in present crisis because [the] thinking [of the] Prime Minister and Cabinet is unknown. However, this is clearly [a] situation in which it is highly desirable USG and HMG should keep in close touch everywhere, i.e. New York, Washington, New Delhi, Karachi, London. Re reaction [of] world public opinion to GOI-GOP conflict, Patrick considers it likely that [the] GOI will be considered [the] aggressor. Asked whether [a] warning to this effect by members [of] SC might deter Nehru, Patrick said he did not know but it was an idea. Embassy will see Patrick tomorrow.       

        Sent Department 6647; repeat New Delhi 149; repeat Karachi 53; Moscow by pouch.

        GALLMAN

From: US Department of State.  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947.  Volume III.  Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972, 186-187.