Kashmir Dispute: Memorandum of Conversation by Assistant Chief of Division of South Asian Affairs, January 10, 1948

501.BC Kashmir/1-1048

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Thurston)

SECRET - WASHINGTON, January 10, 1948

Subject: India-Pakistan Dispute over Kashmir; Proposed Security Council Action

Participants:

Philip Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Leader of the British Delegation to the Security Council
Lord Ismay, Principal Adviser to Mr. Noel-Baker
Lord Inverchapel, British Ambassador to United States
Denis Allen, Counselor of the British Embassy
Mr. Lovett, Under Secretary of State
Mr. Loy Henderson, NEA
Mr. L. E. Thompson, EUR
Mr. Harding Bancroft, SPA
Mr. Ray Thurston, SOA

        Mr. Noel-Baker opened the conversation by emphasizing the danger of a holocaust on the Indian subcontinent arising from the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Neither side can back down, he said. He expressed the opinion that only the voice of international authority can prevent war.

        Mr. Noel-Baker and Lord Ismay then outlined the following proposals which may be said to represent the latest British thinking on a peaceful solution on the Kashmir problem:

1. Informal conciliation efforts at New York to begin just as soon as the Indian and Pakistan delegations arrive.

2. Another warning from the Security Council to both parties in somewhat stronger terms than those used in the message already sent by the president of the Council.

3. The establishment of an ad hoc Committee of the Council as soon as the preliminary debate is finished to work out details of a plan for peaceful settlement.

4. The early despatch to the scene of a small UN commission which would implement the plan worked out in the Council.

5. A complex plan for stopping the fighting and placing Kashmir under UN control pending the holding of a plebiscite.
a. The appointment of a neutral commander by UN to be stationed in Srinagar.
b. A UN commission-of experts in Srinagar.
c. A governing council of Indians and Pakistanis working closely with the above UN group and presumably having as their head an aforementioned neutral commander.
d. A division of the country into zones of military occupation with Pakistan troops in the north, Indian troops in the south, and mixed Indian and Pakistan troops in the valley of Kashmir and in Srinagar proper.
e. One thousand international troops in Srinagar.
f. Scores of "UN observers" in the Indian and Pakistan occupied zones.
g. Agreement on all the above details at New York, presumably including agreement between the Indian and Pakistan delegations.
h. Possibility that end result may be some kind of partition between Moslem and Hindu majorities of Kashmir.

        In elaborating upon the above scheme, the British emphasized the following points:

1. that while they wished to exercise the leadership of this question, their initiative might prove a handicap since it might look like the "reimposition of the British Raj" after only six months of the transfer of power;

2. that they hoped for assistance from the United States both in the informal conciliation efforts and in the working out of the general plan;

3. that Canada was not interested in getting. involved in the issue;

4. that they thought it was necessary for a detailed plan to be worked out in New York, both because "a loud trumpet call" from the UN would have a better, chance of being accepted by the parties on the spot and also because it was necessary to give Pakistan sufficient assurances of a fair plebiscite in order that the tribesmen might be induced to go home.

5. that Russia would probably be quiescent during the consideration of this case since it did not wish to take sides between India and Pakistan.

6. that Kashmir would probably go to Pakistan under a fair plebiscite except perhaps for those Hindu majority districts in the extreme south.

7. that United States prestige in India and Pakistan is extremely high and could play a decisive role in a peaceful solution;

8. that the present Indo-Pakistan Joint Defense Council is not a useful mechanism to use because of its limited terms of reference, and the fact that the Governor-General of India is Chairman.

        In giving the United States attitude on the case, Mr. Lovett made the following points:

1. that although the United States wished to be helpful and the possibility of our giving concrete assistance should not be excluded, we shall have to give this matter the most careful consideration;

2. that the United States is spread out very thinly in its present commitments and must of necessity bear down on the European Recovery program now before Congress;

3. that marked initiative by the United States in this dispute might attract undesirable Russian attention and make a solution more difficult;

4. that we could not be sure of Russia taking a quiescent attitude in this matter merely because it did not wish to take sides since it could adopt an obstructionist role merely in order to keep the pot boiling.

5. that previous experience with the Security Council made it doubtful that quick and effective action could be obtained there.

6. that India and Pakistan have in the past themselves taken an obstructionist role in the UN with respect to United States objectives; reference was made in this connection to previous UN meetings in which Mrs. Pandit seems to have worked rather closely with the Russians.

        In the general discussion some of the US representatives expressed the thought that perhaps the British were setting their sights too high as to what could be done in a short time in the Security Council.

From: US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. Volume V, part 1. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1975, 276-278.