Kashmir Dispute: U.S. Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy in India, August 5, 1949
501.BC Kashmir/7-2949: Telegram
The [US] Secretary of State to the [US] Embassy in India
SECRET - WASHINGTON, August 5,1949-7 p.m.
554. Urtel 851 July 29. Fol paper prepared in Dept as basis for response to Bajpai. You may make such deletions and changes as you deem advisable. In view [of the] informal character [of] Bajpai['s] approach, [the] Dept believes [a] preferable reply [should] be made orally, but [has] no objection [to] your leaving [a] memo of conversation if you feel it desirable. Pls inform Dept [of] action taken, mentioning any substantial departure from fol text:
"US officials in Wash and NY have on numerous occasions expressed to Indian officials and other responsible Indians, concern over the slow progress toward a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The Dept learns with regret that these expressions of concern have been misinterpreted as indications that this Govt questions the good faith of the GOI in its approach to the Kashmir problem. The Dept remains convinced that both India and Pak desire a peaceful solution of the problem, and US officials have endeavored to emphasize this fundamental conviction in all discussions of the Kashmir question.
"The concern of this Govt stems from its support of the objectives of peace and orderly progress in the Indian subcontinent to which the GOI is dedicated. The principal threat to the attainment of these objectives is the continued existence of the Kashmir dispute. The cease fire on Jan l0, 1949 encouraged the Dept to believe that this threat might be removed at an early date. Subsequent slow progress toward a truce agreement has been disappointing and has inevitably aroused apprehension within this Govt of an indefinite prolongation of the dispute.
"Factors attributable to both parties have accounted for the slow pace of the Kashmir negots. Among these may be included the emphasis placed by the GOI on the legal and mil-security aspects of the problem.
"In referring to the GOI's emphasis on its legal rights in Kashmir, the Dept wishes to make clear that it is not here in addressing itself to the validity of the Indian interpretation of those rights. It is suggested, however, that greater flexibility on strictly legal points wld facilitate solution of the problem.
"The Dept was struck by the preponderance of security considerations in the GOI's reply to the Apr 28 truce proposals of the UNCIP. Stress on mil-security factors makes it appear that the GOI lacks confidence in the UN's ability to implement a peaceful settlement of the dispute. To the extent that India's preoccupation with mil-security factors may derive from concepts of strategic importance of Kashmir, the Dept wld observe that strategic considerations in Kashmir become significant only in the event of war between India and Pak or of the invasion of the subcontinent. The Dept cannot believe that responsible statesmen in either India or Pak hold the disastrous view that their two countries will resort to war to resolve their differences. Shld there be external aggression against the subcontinent, the strategic value of Kashmir wld depend, not on its polit affiliation, but on the degree of cooperation between India and Pak in resisting the invader.
"The refusal of the GOI, in connection with the Comm's truce proposals of Apr 28, to permit the UNCIP prior to signature of the truce agreement to inform the GOP of the Indian sched of troop withdrawals reflects emphasis on both security and legal aspects. No major Indian interest seems to have been served by this insistence on its legal position unless the probability of renewed hostilities in Kashmir were assumed. If the GOI did make this assumption, the Dept believes that it was led to do so by its over-emphasis on security factors, as neither the UNCIP, its mil observers, nor this Govt considered a resumption of fighting probable.
"The Dept reiterates its conviction that both India and Pak desire a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The recent agreement on a definitive cease fire line affords further evidence of the good faith of both parties. The Dept strongly hopes that the GOI and the GOP will take advantage of this advance and press forward to the conclusion of an over-all truce agreement. To that end and in response to the friendly and constructive inquiry of the MEA, the Dept has set forth in the preceding paras its frank views on certain aspects of the G0I's approach to the Kashmir problem. 'It is hoped that the MEA will accept these comments in the friendly spirit in which they are offered, and that they will serve to remove any misunderstandings which may have arisen with respect to the Dept's position."
[The] Dept [was] gratified by your prompt and forceful presentation [of the] US position in [your] initial reply to Bajpai. [The] Dept paper omits certain points which you properly emphasized in order [to] make [the] Dept presentation more palatable, in [the] event [it is] brought [to] Nehru's attention. [The] Paper is necessarily general to avoid compromising [the] US position as [a] member [of the] UNCIP.
Shld Bajpai press you for other examples [of] GOI-created difficulties you cld cite position on northern areas as [an] example [of] security emphasis and seating Kashmir Reps in [the] Constituent Assembly as [an] example [of] legal emphasis. Shld he justify security emphasis by pointing to [the] existence [of] Azad forces, you might remind him that [the] GOI agreed to [the] UNCIP Jan 5 Res which deferred this problem to [the] plebiscite period. Moreover, [the] UNCIP has in [the] Dept opinion shown full regard for [the] necessity [of] maintaining balance between Azad forces and GOI and State forces during [the] truce period.
[The] Dept has not discussed Bajpai's approach or reply with Brit or with Indian Emb. Shld you consider [it] desirable [to] inform Brit, advise [the] Dept.
ACHESON
From: US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. Volume VI. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977, 1729-31.