Kashmir Dispute: U.S. Ambassador in India (Henderson) to U.S. Secretary of State, August 15, 1949

845.00/8-1549: Telegram

The [US] Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the [US] Secretary of State

SECRET - NEW DELHI, August 15,1949-3 p.m.

        924. 1. At Nehru's request, I called on him at noon [on] August 13. It was so arranged that I saw Bajpai, Secretary of External Affairs, before meeting [the] Prime Minister. Bajpai handed me a document purporting to set forth [the] reaction [of the] Ministry [of] External Affairs, with respect to the views of [the] Department regarding India's attitude towards Kashmir, which I had conveyed to him on August 9. He said [the] Prime Minister felt keenly about [the] matter and wanted to discuss it with me privately.

        2. Although Nehru greeted me affably, his whole attitude changed when he began discussing Kashmir.... He said he was tired of receiving moralistic advice from [the] US. India did not need advice from [the] US or any other country as to its foreign or internal policies. His own record and that of Indian foreign relations was one of integrity and honesty, which did not warrant admonitions. He did not care to receive lectures from other countries. So far as Kashmir was concerned, he would not give an inch. He would hold his ground even if Kashmir, India, and the whole world would go to pieces. Perhaps he was being emotional but he was justified in feeling deeply about Kashmir. He would not be swayed by talks or persuasion. He was under too deep obligations to Kashmir. He would give [the] state up, only in [the] case [that the] Kashmir people should freely express their desire not to remain a part of India. The Kashmir issue affected [the] underlying philosophy of India, which was that of a secular progressive state all citizens of which could participate in national life without discrimination because of race, color, or religion. This philosophy was opposed to that of Pakistan, which was [a] theocratic state. Pakistan was maneuvering with [the] purpose that people of Kashmir should decide their future on [the] basis of Pakistan's philosophy, rather than that of India. India was determined that any expression of [the] will of [the] people of Kashmir regarding their future should be based on political factors, not on religious hatreds. Plebiscite based on political considerations would be [a] moral victory for India, even if it should lose. One based on religious passions, no matter who won, would arouse hatreds which could injure [the] structure of [the] Indian state.

        After about ten minutes of this, [the] Prime Minister calmed down and spent another 50 minutes outlining developments of recent years in and relating to Kashmir. [A] Memo describing more detail [of the] conversation [is] going forward by air mail.

        3. I was not entirely unprepared for [the] Prime Minister's tirade; I said nothing, remained calm and looked him straight in the face. In [the] latter part of his talk, he used [a] conversational tone of voice and turned on his well-known charm. In finishing, he said he hoped I would not mind if he had been perhaps "somewhat over-forceful" in his opening remarks. I replied that if his remarks reflected his state of mind, it was better that he should have made them; that we were not likely to arrive at an understanding if we entirely concealed our emotions or failed to express frankly our views during conversations on important subjects. It might be just as well, however, if I should regard some of his remarks as made for my personal benefit, not for conveyance as [an] official statement to my government. He said he would leave that to my judgement. He would not like for anything which he had said to injure our relations.

        4. I pointed out [that the] State Department had expressed its views because it had been asked to do so by Bajpai. For it not to have done so when invited would have been unfair to India, to itself, and to cause of peace. Presentation of one's views when requested could not be considered as [the] offering of free advice. Furthermore, there was nothing in [his] views as expressed which cast any reflection on [the] honesty and integrity either of Nehru or of [the] GOI. Therefore, I failed to see [the] pertinency of some of his remarks. The Prime Minister admitted the truth of what I had said.

        5. I said I would try to transmit to Washington [a] fair summary of what he had said. I was afraid I would not be as eloquent an advocate of the Indian side of the Kashmir problem as he. Even though his coming visit to the US was of [a] nonpolitical character, it might be useful if he could find [an] occasion to explain his position with regard Kashmir just as frankly to responsible members of [the] American Government as he had to me. He said would probably do so.

        6. [A] Summary of [the] document given [to] me by Bajpai [is] set forth in another telegram. Copy going forward by pouch.

        HENDERSON

From: US Department of State.  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949.  Volume VI.  Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977, 1732-33.