Kashmir Dispute: U.S. Ambassador in India (Henderson) to U.S. Secretary of State, September 8, 1949

501.BC Kashmir/9-S49: Telegram

The [US] Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the [US] Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NIACT - NEW DELHI, September 8, 1949-5 p.m. 

    1043. Bajpai handed me [a] copy [of] Nehru's reply to President which he telegraphed today to [the] Indian Embassy for delivery to [the] President. I am sending [the] text since it might be helpful for [the] President and [the] Department [to] know [the] nature [of the] reply in advance.

        Text follows:

        "My dear Mr. President,

        I thank you for your letter of the 30th [of] August which your Ambassador presented to me on the 31st [of] August. In view of the importance of its subject matter, I had to consult [with] my colleagues and the Governments of Jammu and Kashmir. This will explain the slight delay in transmitting to you my reply.

        2. I greatly appreciate the friendly solicitude which prompted you to write and particularly welcome your frankness because it enables me to write with equal candour. Since India became independent, and the creation of Pakistan was part of the scheme of transfer of power by Great Britain, we, in India, have been conscious of the need for peace and cooperation between ourselves and Pakistan. One striking example of the genuineness of our desire to be friendly to Pakistan was the transfer to its Government of the equivalent of approximately 150 million dollars at a time when we knew that Pakistan was aiding, abetting the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir and might use this money to further this aggression against India. I could cite other instances but do not wish to overweight this letter with detail.

        3. Kashmir undoubtedly is a cause of acute tension between Pakistan and us. But, as we have already pointed out to your Ambassador, there are other causes as well, the root cause being the emotional climate of Pakistan whose people are being constantly encouraged by its government and leaders to pursue a policy inspired by fear of and hatred towards India in the false belief that India seeks to destroy this new state. Apart from other considerations, it is not to India's interest to have any such aim. Her paramount need is peace in the world, of which the maintenance of friendly relations with her neighbours is an essential condition. In particular, the maintenance of such relations with Pakistan is of the greatest importance because of historical, geographic, economic, and other factors.

        4. You have referred to the inability of my Government and the Government of Pakistan to agree through negotiations with the assistance of the United Nations Commission on terms of truce in Jammu and Kashmir. We have, since the Commission first visited this sub-continent last year, given manifold proof of active cooperation with that body. The last example was our readiness to discuss truce terms, under the auspices of the Commission, with representatives of Pakistan. It was a matter of painful surprise to us that the Commission decided to abandon the idea of a conference, in our view, primarily because Pakistan refused even to discuss some matters to which we attach importance, particularly the large-scale disbanding and disarming of so called 'Azad Kashmir' forces, a stop to which, according to assurances given us, [the] Commission has agreed. As we have repeatedly stated to [the] Commission, firm decisions to implement this assurance are [the] condition precedent to withdrawal of our forces. Without satisfactory arrangements for large scale disbanding and disarming of 'Azad' forces, withdrawal of Indian forces will gravely imperil [the] security of [the] portion of the state held by us. And, unless there is this large-scale disbanding and disarming of 'Azad' forces, the conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite cannot come into being.

        5. As regards [the] Commission's proposal for arbitration, I should like to state, at the outset, that India is not opposed to [the] principle of arbitration. Arbitration is, under Article 33(l) of [the] Charter of [the] United Nations, one of the methods of achieving a peaceful solution of a dispute which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and India is a firm believer in principles embodied in [this] Charter. The reference to arbitration should, however, be of a precise and defined issue which, if settled by the method, will have [the] effect of creating conditions for ending a dispute that threatens international peace and security. The proposal for arbitration as presented to us by the Commission does not satisfy the necessary conditions and we have found ourselves unable [to] accept it for reasons which are briefly set out below:

(1) According to interpretation given to us, the arbitrator would have authority not only to arbitrate, but would also be free to determine points on which he should arbitrate. So far as [the] Government of India are aware, this procedure is novel, and without precedent, and could hardly be justified.

(2) The main difference between us and the Government of Pakistan is about disbanding and disarming of 'Azad Kashmir' forces. The Commission has given us an assurance that there is to be large-scale disarming of these forces. If steps to implement assurance are not taken immediately, it will be impossible for us, consistently with [the] necessity of safeguarding portion of [the] Jammu and Kashmir state against a repetition of [the] horrors of [the] invasion of the valley in October, 1947, to withdraw the bulk of our forces. Moreover, if there is to be no large-scale disbandment and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces, one of [the] essential conditions for holding free and impartial plebiscite will not be satisfied. As we explained to [the] Commission's principal representative, Dr. Lozano, when he discussed with us the draft of what subsequently became [the] Commission's resolution of [the] 5th [of] January, 1949, with such [a] large number [of] members of [the] 'Azad Kashmir forces' under arms, it will be impossible for a substantial number of persons normally resident in [the] so-called Azad-Kashmir area who are now refugees to express their opinion freely re [the] future of the State. The large-scale disbanding and disarmament of 'Azad-Kashmir' forces is therefore, not a matter for arbitration, but for affirmative and immediate decision.

        6. I would also like to draw your attention to [the] fact that since the assurance re disbanding and disarment of 'Azad-Kashmir' forces was given to us by [the] Commission, [the] number of these forces has been increased by Pakistan considerably. For all practical purposes, they form a part of [the] Pakistan Army. The mere withdrawal of the regular Pakistan Army from [the] territory of Jammu and Kashmir State will thus leave a large and well-trained army under Pakistan leadership behind in the State territory. That will be contrary to [the] basis of [the] resolution of [the] UN Commission of [the] 13th [of] August, 1948 and will create a new situation full of peril to the State. It is for this reason that we have laid stress on [the] inter-dependence of phrasing of the withdrawal of their forces from the State with the disbanding and disarming of the 'Azad-Kashmir' forces.

        7. In conclusion I wish [to] assure you that India does not wish the Kashmir, or any other dispute [to] be settled by the sword. She will always be ready to consider a solution by any method that would lead to a peaceful settlement of the entire dispute.

        May I ask you, Mr. President, to accept the best wishes of the Government and people of India for the great nation of which you are the chosen head and, for yourself, the assurance of my most friendly sentiments and my highest consideration.

        Yours sincerely, signed Jawaharlal Nehru."

        HENDERSON

From: US Department of State.  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949.  Volume VI.  Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977, 1736-38.