Warren Hastings to the Court of Directors, reflecting on the Government of Bengal, 11 November 1773

Honourable Sirs,

        I have been duly honoured with your letter of the 16th April by the Harcourt and duplicate of the same by the Egmont.

         I am at a loss for words to convey the sense which I entertain of the honourable terms in which, you have been pleased to express your approbation of my services. While my gratitude is excited by these instances of your kindness, I feel my zeal encouraged by the assurances which you have been pleased to afford me of your continued protection. My best expression of thanks for both must be made by my future conduct, which (if I know my own heart) will never be drawn. by any bias, however powerful, from the pursuit of your interests, nor do I wish or aspire to any reward superior to your applause.

        While I indulge the pleasure which I receive from the past success of my endeavours, I own I cannot refrain from looking back with a mixture of anxiety on the omissions by which I am sensible I may since have hazarded the diminution of your esteem. All my letters addressed to your honourable Court, and to the Select Committee, repeat the strongest promises of prosecuting the inquiries into the conduct of your servants, which you had been pleased to commit particularly to my charge. You will readily believe that I must have been sincere in those declarations, since it would have argued great indiscretion to have made them, had I foreseen my inability to perform them. I find myself now under the disagreeable necessity of avowing that inability; at the same time that I will boldly take upon me to affirm that on whomsoever you might have delegated that charge, and by whatever powers it might have been accompanied, it would have been sufficient to occupy the entire attention of those who were entrusted with it, and even with all the aids of leisure and authority would have proved ineffectual. I dare appeal to the public records, to the testimony of those who have opportunities of knowing me, and even to the detail which the public voice can report of the past acts of this government, that my time has been neither idly nor uselessly employed. Yet such are the cares and embarrassments of this various state, that although much may be done, much more, even in matters of moment, must necessarily remain neglected. To select from the miscellaneous heap which each day's exigencies present to our choice those points on which the general welfare of your affairs most essentially depends, to provide expedients for future advantages, and guard against probable evils, are all that your administration can faithfully promise to perform for your service with their united labours most diligently exerted. They cannot look back, without sacrificing the objects of their immediate duty, which are those of your interests, to endless researches which can produce no real good, and may expose your affairs to all the ruinous consequences of personal malevolence both here and at home.

        May I be permitted, in all deference and submission to your commands, to offer it as my opinion, that whatever may have been the conduct of individuals or even of the collective members of your former administrations, the blame is not so much imputable to them as to the want of a principle of government adequate to its substance, and a coercive power to enforce it. The extent of Bengal, and its possible resources, are equal to those of most states in Europe. Its difficulties are greater than those of any, because it wants both an established form and powers of government, deriving its actual support from the unremitted labour and personal exertion of individuals in power instead of the vital influence which flows through the channels of a regular constitution, and imperceptibly animates every part of it. Our constitution is nowhere to be traced but in ancient charters which were framed for the jurisdiction of your trading settlements, the sales of your exports, and the provision of your annual investment. I need not observe how incompetent these must prove for the government of a great kingdom, and for the preservation of its riches from private violence and embezzlement.

        Among your servants, who for a course of years have been left at large in possession of so tempting a deposit, it is not to be wondered at that many have applied it to the advancement of their own fortunes, or that those who were possessed of abilities to introduce a system of better order should have been drawn along by, the general current, since few men are inspired with so large a share of public virtue as to sacrifice their interests, peace, and social feelings to it, and to begin the work of reformation on themselves.

        I should not have presumed to expatiate on a subject of this nature, although my own justification has made it in some measure necessary, but that your late advices have given hopes that we shall speedily be furnished with your instructions for establishing a system of law and polity which we hitherto want. Whenever this work shall be accomplished on a foundation of consistency and permanency, I will venture to foretell, from the knowledge which I have of the general habits and manners of your servants, that you will hear of as few instances of licentiousness amongst them as among the members of any community in the British Empire. As this, whenever attempted, must necessarily be a work of time, I entreat your permission to submit to your consideration such, defects in your present system as my experience has suggested to me, and I hope my intention will be judged with candour, although my own ambition may be gratified by the regulations which I wish to recommend. I shall offer but two points to your notice. One is the rapid succession of your governors; the other, the undefined powers of the respective members of your administration. Both are productive of the same ill effects, a want of vigour and consistency in public measures, and a general diffidence and the consequent spirit of intrigue in those whose interests or services are by any mode of relation connected with our government.

        These well-known infirmities in our constitution were frequently alluded to by the Vizier in the late conferences which I had with him at Benares. He lamented the perpetual hazard to which he was exposed of losing the English friendship by the continual changes of their chiefs, who were no sooner known to him, and a confidence established with them, than they were recalled, and others substituted in their stead; whose tempers he was to study, and whose affections he was to conciliate anew, and then to lose them as he had lost their predecessors, and have the same fruitless labour to repeat for ever. He once asked me in plain terms what assurances I could give him that new conditions would not be required of him or that those for which I should have pledged the faith of the Company should not be eluded by a new act of government, if six members of the Council should at any time propose an infraction of the treaty, and four only joined me in opposing it.

        The powers of the Governor, although supposed to be great, are in reality little more than those of any individual in his Council. Their compliance, his own abilities, or a superior share of attention, and the opinion that he possesses extraordinary powers, may give him the effect of them, and an ascendant over his associates in the administration; but a moment's contention is sufficient to discover the nakedness of his authority, and to level him with the rest. Happily I find myself sufficiently secured against such effects. The notice with which you have distinguished my services, the injunctions which you have laid on the other members of the Board to afford me their support, and the degree of responsibility which you have been pleased to attribute to my particular conduct, have contributed to strengthen my hands against any improper opposition. At the same time I must do the gentlemen of the Board the justice to declare that I have found in them so cordial a disposition to cooperate with me in every measure for the public good, that I feel no want of extraordinary powers for myself, nor, under such favourable circumstances, as it my wish to possess them. I mention this want only as a, defect in the service, which is rendered still more important by the false opinion that the principal authority rests constitutionally in the hands of the President, when in effect it is merely accidental.

        To draw the line between, him and the other members of his administration, and to define the powers which may be entrusted to his charge, would not be an easy task. In me it may be deemed assuming; yet I conceive it to be my duty, because I am convinced that the future prosperity, and even the being of the Company, and of the national interests in this great kingdom, depend upon it. The distant and slow interposition of the supreme power which is lodged in your hands cannot apply the remedies to the disorders which may arise in your state. A principle of vigour, activity, and decision must rest somewhere. In a body of men entrusted with it, its efficacy is lost by being too much divided. It is liable to still worse consequences, the less the number is of which the body consists, because the majority is easier formed. Fixed to a single point only it can command confidence and ensure consistency. I am compelled to affirm, because I know not by what arguments to prove, what appears to me a self-evident maxim.

        On the other hand there is a danger that such a power may be abused, unless powerful checks be provided to counteract the misapplication of it. These I leave to your wisdom to form, if the modification of it which I shall propose shall be found inadequate to the purpose. I will not take up more of your attention on this subject, but proceed to describe the points of distinction which appear to me necessary for ascertaining the respective provinces of the Council, the Select Committee, and the President.

        1. The Select Committee shall have the power of making peace and war, and of determining all measures respecting both, independent of the Council at large. But they shall enter into no treaty of alliance, whether offensive or defensive for a longer duration than two years without a special authority from the honourable the Court of Directors. Every such treaty shall be communicated to the Council at large as soon as it conveniently may be, that their opinion upon it may be transmitted with it to the Court of Directors.

        2. It shall nevertheless be allowable for the President to bring any matter before the Council at large, although included within the foregoing limitations, and the decision of the Council thereon shall be valid and binding on the Select Committee. But no other members of the Committee shall be allowed the same privilege.

        3. The President shall have the privilege of acting by his own separate authority on such urgent and extraordinary cases as shall in his judgement require it, notwithstanding any decision of the Council, or of the Committee passed thereon. On every such occasion the President shall record his resolution to act in the manner above specified, in virtue of the power thus vested in him, and shall expressly declare that he charges himself with the whole responsibility.

        4. All civil appointments within the provinces shall be made by the Board at large, but the President shall be empowered of his own authority to prevent any particular appointment, and to recall any person, not being a member of the Board, from his station, even without a reason assigned. All appointments beyond the provinces, and all military appointments which are not in the regular line of promotion, shall be made by the President alone.

        I shall forbear to comment on the above propositions. If just and proper, their utility will be self-apparent. One clause only in the last article may require some explanation, namely, the power proposed for the governor of recalling any person from his station without assigning a reason for it. In the charge of oppression, although supported by the cries of the people and the most authentic representations, it is yet impossible in most cases to obtain legal proofs of it, and unless the discretionary power which I have recommended be somewhere lodged, the assurance of impunity from any formal inquiry will baffle every order of the Board, as on the other hand the fear of the consequences will restrain every man within the bounds of his duty if he knows himself liable to suffer by the effect of a single control.

        I beg leave to return to the first subject herein offered to your consideration by declaring that as I have no wish in life equal to that of being useful in the sphere which has been allotted me, so it is my fixed resolution to devote my services to the Honourable Company so long as your pleasure and my health will allow me: and I offer it as my humble opinion that on whomsoever you shall think fit to bestow the place which I now hold in your service, it will be advisable to fix him in it for a long period of time. I have already mentioned the principal evils which arise from the too frequent changes of your governors. I will beg leave to add another, in which I shall need your candour to obviate any misconstructions of it to my own prejudice.

        The first command of a state so extensive as that of Bengal is not without opportunities of private emoluments, and although the allowances which your bounty has liberally provided for your servants may be reasonably expected to fix the bounds of their desires, yet you will find it extremely difficult to restrain men from profiting by other means, who look upon their appointment as the measure of a day, and who, from the uncertainty of their condition, see no room for any acquisition but of wealth, since reputation and the consequence which follows the successful conduct of great affairs are only to be attained in a course of years. Under such circumstance, however rigid your orders may be, or however supported, I am afraid that in most instances they will produce no other fruits than either avowed disobedience or the worse extreme of falsehood and hypocrisy. These are not the principles which should rule the conduct of men whom you have constituted the guardians of your property, and checks on the morals and fidelity of others. The case of self-preservation will naturally suggest the necessity of seizing the opportunity of present power, when the duration of it is considered as limited to the usual term of three years, and of applying it to the provision of a future independency. Therefore every renewal of this term is liable to prove a reiterated oppression.

        It is perhaps owing to the causes which I have described, and a proof of their existence, that this appointment has been for some years past so eagerly solicited, and so easily resigned. There are yet other inconveniences attendant on this habit, and perhaps an investigation of them all would lead to endless discoveries. Every man whom your choice has honoured with so distinguished a trust seeks to merit approbation and acquire an éclat by innovations, for which the wild scene before him affords ample and justifiable occasion. But innovations of real use require a length of time, and the unremitting application of their original principles to perfect them. Their immediate effects are often hurtful, and their intended benefits remote, or virtually diffused through such concealed channels that their source is not easy to be traced. Of this nature are the late regulations in your revenue customs, and in the commerce of the country, which have been attended with an immediate loss in the collections, and in the price of your investment; and it will require a long and intricate train of reasoning to prove that the future increase of population, of national wealth, of the revenue and trade, should such be the happy effects of these expedients, were really produced by them. But who that looks only for present applause or present credit would hazard both for remote advantages, of which another might arrogate the merit and assume the reward? Or who will labour with equal perseverance for the accomplishment of measures projected by others, as of those of which he was himself the contriver?

        Although I disclaim the consideration of my own interest in these speculations, and flatter myself I proceed upon more liberal grounds, yet I am proud to avow the feelings of an honest ambition that stimulates me to aspire at the possession of my present station for years to come. Those who know my natural turn of mind will not ascribe this to sordid views, a very few years possession of the government would undoubtedly enable me to retire with a fortune amply fitted to the measure of my desires, were I to consult only my own ease; but in my present situation I feel my mind expand to something greater. I have catched the desire of applause in public life. The important transactions in which I have been engaged, and my wish to see them take complete effect, the public approbation which you have been pleased to stamp on them, and the estimation which that cannot fail to give me in the general opinion of mankind, lead me to aim at deserving more; and I wish to dedicate all my time, health, and labour to a service which has been so flattering in its commencement.

        Such are my views and such my sentiments. I expose them without reserve, because I am conscious you will find nothing unworthy in them, whatever opinion you may form of their expediency.

        I shall wait your determination with becoming expectation but without anxiety, nor shall I ever less esteem the favours I have already received, because others are withheld which it may be either not expedient or impracticable to grant.

        I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, honourable Sirs, &c.

[Hastings]

From: A. Berriedale Keith, ed. Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy, 1750-1921. Vol. I. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1922, 34-45.