Warren Hastings to Laurence Sullivan, reflecting on conditions in India, 21 March 1776

Dear Sir, 

        Whatever cause may have heretofore intervened to prevent the decision from being passed on me and my opponents, so many alarming circumstances have lately occurred to show the absolute necessity of putting a speedy end to the disorders of this government, that I think it impossible for them to suffer it to remain longer in a state of distraction. The remedy may be administered when the evil is past cure. 

        The provinces of Bengal enjoy peace, but no measures are taken for ensuring it; none for the prevention of its internal disorders; none of any kind whatsoever, but such as are calculated to intimidate those who have ever looked to me for protection, or to repeal or render abortive those of my administration. Bitter complaints have been reiterated in all the letters of the majority, that the rents were overrated in the last settlement, yet they reproach me with not having realized it, and refuse to allow of the smallest deduction or remission in the revenues. Complaints are heard only against myself, or others through whom they may be converted by implication to charges against me; and every decision even on matters in which it is commonly esteemed the most dishonourable to admit of a personal bias, has been dictated solely by the spirit of party. The Dewanny Courts of Justice faintly exist, but without any control; the Sudder Dewanny, or Court of Appeals, which served as a check and a guard on the rest, having been long since formally abolished. The Foujdarry, or Criminal Courts, which formerly depended on myself, have scarce dared to act since the arrival of the new members of the Council; and the whole Province is at this time, even to the boundaries of Calcutta, a prey to dacoits. This evil will, I hope, receive some alleviation from the care of Mahommed Reza Cawn, to whom the charge of maintaining the peace of the country, and the superintendence of the Court of Criminal Justice, has been committed. But his authority is feeble; and though he has been in possession of it these five months, its effects have not yet appeared. He looks, as others do, to a period of tranquillity. With his appointment, which is expressly against the orders of the Company, the Nabob was declared sovereign of the provinces, and possessed of all the rights of the Nizamut, that is, the exclusive power of administering justice in criminal cases, of appointing guards for the protection of the country, and of punishing all violators of the peace; that is to say, in other words he is the present instrument of the majority, in the hands of Mahommed Reza Cawn, to execute any violence which they may dictate unseen; and armed by their public and repeated declarations with rights that will enable him to assume an uncontrolled rule for his own behalf, as soon as he shall have spirit to assert them. 

        It is a little extraordinary that every measure which was taken in the course of my government, though generally approved, has been either repealed, or means taken to render it of no effect, without an attempt to introduce any other system in its stead. Nothing, say they, can now save the country from ruin, but to replace Mahommed Reza Cawn in the authority which I took out of his hands by the orders of the Court of Directors, and to restore the charge of the collections to supervisors. These measures are even recommended in a plan which Mr. Francis sent by the last ship to the Court of Directors for the new settlement, and why, I cannot conceive, unless it be for the sake of loading me with reproach for having removed both. The maxims which I laid down for my conduct, and by which it was invariably guided, were these: First, to implant the authority of the Company, and the sovereignty of Great Britain, in the constitution of this country. Secondly, to abolish all secret influence, and make the government itself responsible for all measures, by making them all pass by its avowed authority. Thirdly, to remove all impediments which pre- vented the complaints of the people from reaching the ears of the supreme administration, or established an independent despotism in its agents. Fourthly, to relieve the reiats from oppressive taxes. Fifthly, to introduce a regular system of justice and protection into the country. Sixthly, to relieve the distresses of the Company at home-you know how great they were-and pay off their heavy debts here, by a uniform and regular mode of collecting their rents, by savings in expenses, and by foreign acquisitions of wealth. And lastly, to extend the political influence of the Company without enlarging their territory or dividing their military strength. 

        I need not repeat the means which were used to accomplish these ends. The present government has proceeded on principles diametrically opposite to mine. First, they have broken all the arrangements which I made in the Nabob's family in 1772; replaced Mahommed Reza Cawn; restored the office of Naib Suba; dismissed the Begum from her office, which I had assigned her for the express and sole purpose of guarding the Company's authority against encroachment or competition; publicly proclaimed the Nabob's sovereignty, and disclaimed that of the Company. Secondly, they have made their own power uncontrolled, and contrived to preclude its operations from public view, by the pretended independency granted to Mahommed Reza Cawn. Thirdly, they have abolished, or rendered of no effect, all the courts of justice, and avow their intentions of restoring the collectorships. Fourthly, they exclaimed against me for overcharging the revenue, though I (I mean, whenever I speak of myself, the late administration) struck off every oppressive article of it, and let the lands on lower terms than the jumna of former years, but such only as the lands, under favourable circumstances, might very well bear, allowing for accidents of drought and inundation, which might entitle the farmers to indulgences. These indulgences, whenever they could prove their title to them, I always granted. The majority allow of none; but while they declare the reiats oppressed, refuse to consent to a single remission which might relieve them. One instance may serve to show the spirit with which they conduct themselves on this occasion. Rajah Cheyton Sing, the zemindar of Bissenpoor, had a writ out against him for a debt. He was actually in the charge of the sheriff's officer. To prevent his being brought in that disgraceful state to Calcutta, or being thrown into jail, I obtained an order from the under-sheriff for his present discharge, offering myself as the security for his appearance in Calcutta. As soon as the Board met, I informed them of what I had done, and recommended to them to take the Rajah under the protection of the Board, and to assist him in his suit, as this was the first instance; and the decision of it, if favourable to the zemindar, by declaring him exempted from the jurisdiction of the Court, would serve as a precedent in all similar cases. They rejected my proposal; said that, as I had bailed the zemindar without any authority from the Board, I must stand to the consequences; that they would not interfere, but let the law take its course, that the Company might see what dangerous strides the Supreme Court were taking to assume an absolute power over the country. Sixthly, they have branded the suspension of the King's tribute with the appellation of violation of public faith; they have called the cession of Corah the sale of others' property; they have called the subsidy which I had fixed with the Vizier at 210,000 rupees (and which they have augmented to 260,000 rupees), and the stipulation for the Rohilla war, a mercenary prostitution of the Company's arms for hire; they have paid off a part of the bonded debt with the means furnished by these acts of injustice, and now lay claim to the whole merit of it, though it is impossible for them to produce a single instance, in the whole period of their administration, of a rupee saved, or a rupee gained, by any measure of theirs, except the late acquisition of Benares, obtained at the expense of twice the amount of its yearly revenue, which the Nabob of Oude owes to the Company, and which he can never pay them. Lastly, by their pernicious interference in the affairs of Bombay, and by the weakness of their measures in the treaty with the Nabob of Oude, and their subsequent conduct to him, they perverted the great controlling powers of this government to a means of contracting the Company's influence, and of annihilating every advantage which the former servants of the Company had secured for them beyond the limits of Bengal. 

        The distracted state of the province of Oude exceeds description. The Nabob's character you will learn from universal report. His minister, Moeteiza Cawn, is possessed of all his master's vices, with an ordinary share of understanding, and is in possession of the country, with every place of trust and profit in it. The Nabob's finances and resources are totally exhausted. His troops are disaffected to a man. They have been permitted to oppose his authority in instances of the most criminal disobedience, and the only severity which has been ever exercised towards them was in the massacre of 20,000 of his sepoys, (at least Bristow computes the loss at that amount) who mutinied for their pay. This horrid event passed about a month ago. Happily the presence of our brigade serves to check the intestine commotions, of his country, and he has no present enemy to throw the materials, which his misconduct has accumulated for his own destruction., into a blaze. The smallest spark of foreign troubles will certainly blow him up. 

        I have already been so exceedingly prolix on the preceding subjects, that I shall be more concise on the affairs of Bombay. Mr. Taylor [an agent sent from Bombay to protest against the abrupt intervention of the Bengal Government] tells me that he has already written to you a very minute detail of all the transactions both of that government and of this in relation to the Mahratta war. I shall, therefore, chiefly dwell on my own part in it. 

        I have always considered the capture of Salsette as an act of necessity, and of good policy, nor inconsistent with the most rigid principles of political justice. 

        I never approved of the treaty with Ragobah, nor the precipitate measure of the war undertaken without a force or treasure to support it, without a plan of conduct, and with little necessity and less profit to require it. But as it is almost impossible to withdraw from a war before the conclusion of it with honour or safety, had it rested with me I would have directed them to prosecute their original design by escorting Ragobah to Poona, and to get clear of the war as soon as they could with honour and safety. But I was not in a situation to dictate, and the language of the majority was to order the Presidency of Bombay to withdraw their forces immediately, and without any reservation. All the good that I could do was by temporizing. I therefore advised that an order should be sent to withdraw the army, but I proposed to qualify the order with the following exceptions: 1st. That the safety of the troops might be endangered by it. 2nd. That any decisive advantage had been gained over the enemy; and, thirdly, that a negotiation had taken place. In either of these cases I proposed that the order should not have effect. The majority adopted the first exception, but rejected the other two. I from the first advised, and repeatedly urged them to send supplies both of men and money to Bombay, as the only means of commanding a peace or enabling the gentlemen of Bombay to renew the war with advantage. In this opinion I was supported by Mr. Barwell. The war is now renewed, as might have been expected, at a season in which it is impossible to assist them either with men or money. We have, indeed, sent them eighty men and five lacs of rupees, but the ships which carry these little aids are not yet gone, nor can possibly arrive before the rains. We have given them permission to draw upon us for five lacs more. 

        If the decided union of the English in every part of India with Ragobah should establish his credit, and give partizans to his cause, which is not unlikely, and if the war is well conducted, it is most probable that it will be concluded in this campaign; and if it is, you will certainly hear of it before you receive this letter. If you do not hear of it, you may conclude that the war is protracted to the next season, and I think the issue of  it will then depend on Bengal, and will require all its exertions. 

        Such as I have described it is the present state of this government, and I presume that it is unnecessary to add other proofs of the necessity of deciding the authority which shall rule it, and apply the remedies to so many complicated disorders. I do not believe that any part of the conduct of General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, or any proofs that they have given of their integrity or abilities, will operate to my prejudice, or recommend them for the charge of such a state. Nevertheless, even a determination in their favour would be better than to leave things as they are, for while every proposition which comes before the Board of whatever nature receives the tincture of party, even the absolute authority which they possess must prove insufficient to conduct them with consistency through their own measures or designs. 

        My respectable friend, Sir Elijah, has undertaken to give my plan for the better administration of justice, which went by the last ship, and which I hope you have read, the form of an act of parliament, and I hope he will be able to complete it in time for it to go by this packet. All the judges approve of it, and I like it myself, which is not always the case with my own productions. I cannot wish to deceive you, and you will think better of me than to suspect me of endeavouring to make you the instrument of deceiving others. With this preface I assure you that it is scarce possible to have acted with more moderation or caution than Sir Elijah has observed in all cases in which the ordinary process of Supreme Court was likely to affect the collection and management of the public revenue. Indeed, the other judges merit the same testimony in their favour. Had a cordial understanding subsisted between the Court and the Council, much of the inconvenience that has arisen from the writs of the Court would have been avoided, nor would the revenue have been in the least affected by them; but it seems to have been a maxim of the Board to force the Court into extremities for the purpose of finding fault with them. Yet in many cases the acts of the Court have been, and must continue to be, the unavoidable cause of embarrassment. This is owing to a defect in its constitution. By the limitation of its powers it must ever remain a doubt what is the extent of them, as every man in the provinces is in reality subjected to the authority of the Company. If it was constituted to protect the people from oppression, that design would be entirely frustrated were the Board at liberty to employ agents who should be exempt from its authority; and you will have seen many instances in the papers which I have sent home of the most glaring acts of oppression committed by the Board which would have produced the ruin of the parties over whom they were exercised but for the protection of the Court. Great complaints have been made of zemindars and others, who are not liable to the jurisdiction of the Court by the plain construction of the Act, having been arrested, and some thrown into prison by its warrants. But no attention has been paid to the necessity which there is of bringing the persons who are even excluded by the Act from the jurisdiction of the Court in the same way before it to establish their exemption. They may plead to its jurisdiction, and obtain their discharge; but till this is clone, I cannot see how it is possible to make the distinction, for if every man who declared himself to be no British subject, nor employed by any, was, in virtue of his own declaration, to be exempted from their authority, all men would make the plea. Their right to this exemption must be tried to be known, and they must be compelled to appear, or give bail for their appearance, that it may be tried. 

        The truth is, that a thing done by halves is worse than if it were not done at all. The powers of the Court must be universal, or it would be better to repeal them altogether. The attempt to make a distinction has introduced the most glaring absurdities and contradictions into the Act which virtually declares the British sovereignty over the provinces even in the qualifications which are made use of to limit it. It is declared that the jurisdiction of the Court shall be exercised over all British subjects, and over all who are, or ever were, in the employ of British subjects, that is over those who are not British subjects, and of course have no relation or dependence on the British sovereignty, which is thus usurped over them. Even in the most ordinary process of the Court, the distinction must be broken through or all its acts impeded. The issuing of subpoenas to witnesses is as much an act of authority as warrants of capias, and the parties on whom they are served must be liable to penalties in case of disobedience; yet it would be the extreme of absurdity to say that no man should be compelled to appear as an evidence who was not a British subject, because it would be impossible in such a case to administer justice; and it is equally a contradiction to say that the persons over whom the authority of the British law is thus exercised are not amenable to it.

        I hope that my plan will be found to provide the most effectual relief against all the imperfections of the Act as it now stands. On the one hand, it proposes to give to the Supreme Court an unlimited (but not exclusive) authority over all; and on the other, it provides for the administration of justice in all cases to which its jurisdiction cannot conveniently extend, without the danger of a competition with it. In this coalition of the British judicature with the Dewanny, the latter will obtain a more steady and confirmed authority than it has yet ever possessed; and being open to the daily inspection and control of the judges, the Dewanny Courts will acquire a more regular and legal form than they could have if left to themselves. But I trust the design will best speak for itself, for it has at least the merit of simplicity and precision, if it possesses no other. One only alteration has been made in it in the draft which Sir Elijah is making for me. The superintendent of the Court, called Adawlut Dewanny Zillajaut, who was proposed to be a member of the Provincia Council, as is now the case, holding that office by rotation , is now proposed to be an independent officer (I mean independent of the Provincial Council), and to be removable only for misconduct or by voluntary resignation ; and he is to be the judge of all causes that do not immediately regard the revenues (as disputes between farmers, and other proprietors or agents of the collections), which are left to the Provincial Councils.

        Mem.-The Superintendent at present holds his office in monthly rotation. My plan lengthens it to a year. Mr. Chambers, on the same grounds, suggested the propriety of making it perpetual, and to be held by a person not a member of the Provincial Council., which I immediately adopted, the Chief Justice concurring in the same opinion.

        There is one point which makes me dread exceedingly the bad effects of a longer continuance of the present scene of disorder. The five years' settlement expires in March 1777. Many previous arrangements ought to be made some time before the new settlement takes place. I would, had I power, begin them now, but nothing can be done by the present government, which has no principle but that of f action to guide it, and God help this country if it is decided that it shall be left to such rulers.

        I have already made my letter of so enormous a size, that I ought in conscience to put an end to it; but I have been long used to treat you as the confidential repository of my thoughts as they flow warm from my imagination in their natural order, and without correction or reserve, and I have one matter still remaining which is too nearly connected with my own feelings to be suppressed.

        I had lately occasion to look over my letters, which were written before the new government took place, to the Court of Directors, and other papers which were written before that period either in recommendation of my own measures, or in refutation of the objections which were made to them. I was struck with the contrast of my own mode of conduct with that of General Clavering and his associates in a more steady adherence to one principle than I myself had ever before suspected, having conformed to it more from the prevailing bent of my own disposition, than from attention to it as a fixed rule of action.

        I believe it will be admitted that the government of Bengal never underwent a greater number of variety of changes in all its departments than in the short interval of time in which I presided in it. It seems almost a necessary consequence that new measures imply that the old are wrong, and of course the authors of them deficient either in integrity, ability, or attention. What a field for personal obloquy was this for a man whose feelings might be wounded by the personal successes of men wealthier than himself or whose spirit could descend to undermine the reputations of others for the sake of building his own on their ruins!

        It is with a pride of heart, in which, if I know yours, it will join, that I can now declare that in all the time which I have been speaking of, I never, either in my public minutes or letters, or in my separate addresses to the Court of Directors, or their Secret Committee, to whom I could have written what I pleased without the hazard of a reply from those whose conduct I might have impeached; nor, I verily believe, in any part of my private correspondence, made use of any argument or assertion which could be imputed to me as proceeding from the least personal ill-will to any of my predecessors, or present opponents in the service. I do not remember that I had ever occasion to make use of the names of either Mr. Cartier, Mr. Verelst, or even Lord Clive; or that in the heat of contest (and I have at times had strong provocation), I ever suffered my pen to express so great a degree of warmth against any man as I have shown (and that never with intemperance, at least I hope not) in private explanations. Sir Robert Barker, Graham, and Barwell are instances of this. These gentlemen might find much cause to be pleased with what I have written unknown to them, but none (I am sure) to complain that I have ever used their names to their discredit.

        My conduct to the inferior servants of the Company has been marked with the same moderation. Many sources of profit were shut up, and strict rules made for contingent disbursements, which at one time rendered me very unpopular; but I am told that those who were most offended at these restraints now do me the justice to acknowledge their necessity, and to testify that in enforcing them, I never suffered myself to be biased by partiality or prejudice to any man.

        Many of my letters to the Company, and many of a private nature, but addressed to persons of high rank, or great influence, have treated of the disorders and irregularities of the service, but these I have always attributed (as in my heart I still do) to a defective constitution, not to a depravity of principle in the servants of the Company. To conclude, whatever may be the lot perhaps already assigned me, I am certain that if ever I am compelled to submit my conduct to the public, my character will stand as fair in their eyes, and my integrity as unblemished as those of any man who ever served the Company, though in abilities I may have been exceeded by many. I am with the warmest affection and the truest esteem, dear Sir, your faithful and most obedient servant.

        PS.-Since writing the above, all that I have said about our Mahratta negotiations is rendered of no consequence. The declaration of the Poona ministers proved to be a mere bravado. By a letter since received from Colonel Upton, dated 24th February, we are informed, that they have assented to the treaty with all the conditions which he required of them, which amount to little more than, that we shall keep Salsette, which we have got, and they Bassein which we could not take; I am too much hurried to give you the particulars. I have written to Mr. Elliot fully upon them, and he will show you my letter. I have taken much pains to temper the severity of our Board, in their letters to Bombay; and Mr. Taylor, if he has done me justice, will have told you, that he has profited by my advice. You long ago knew my wish to see a control given to this government over the other Presidencies, but I never meant such a control as is now exercised; nor did the Parliament mean it. The Act gives us a mere negative power, and no more. It says the other Presidencies shall not make war nor treaties without the sanction of this government, but carefully guards against every expression which can imply a power to dictate what the other Presidencies shall do; much less does it authorize the Governor-General and Council to make cessions and exchange places for the other Presidencies. Instead of uniting all the powers of India, all the use we have hitherto made of this Act of Parliament has been to tease and embarrass.

From: A. Berriedale Keith, ed. Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy, 1750-1921. Vol. I. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1922, 66-82.