The Marquess of Hastings to the Court of Directors, 8 February 1818

HONOURABLE SIRS,

All essential operations (except in the State of Poona) being now terminated, and our arrangements hazing taken their destined shape, I do myself the honour of stating to you the general issue of the campaign.

Matters had a different turn from that on which every probability authorized me to reckon, as soon as the treaty was signed by Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The engagements to which he subscribed were an acknowledgement of his inability to counteract the measures contemplated against the Pindarries; and no other power appeared to have either inducement or means to support the banditti against the force which we had put into motion. No surmise existed of other ground of contest. The perfidious endeavours of the Peishwah to excite the native sovereigns against us were, indeed, known: but it did not seem natural that they should have made any impression; far less could it be suspected that absolute obligations for co-operating with him had been plighted.

From the above prospect, no result could enter less into the speculations of your government, than that any advantage should be acquired for the Honourable Company, beyond the establishment of a pacific system in Central India. Though the undertaking this great object was imposed upon you by the duty of securing your subjects in future against such ravages as those which they had experienced in two successive years, the suppression of a powerful body, professedly banded for the purpose of indiscriminate plunder, and which accompanied its rapine with acts of the most atrocious inhumanity, was in itself an enterprise becoming a British Government. That our motives might be thoroughly unequivocal, it was my anxious wish that the reputation of so laudable a service should alone remunerate the Honourable Company for the effort; and, with a premature confidence, I took the liberty of expressing to you my joy at the likelihood of our accomplishing the end, without a particle of defalcation from the possessions of any native sovereign. If those hopes have been defeated, it will appear not to have been through any provocation on our part: and if addition shall be made to your territory, it will be seen that it is only through the imperious necessity of guarding against the speedy renewal of a treachery so rooted in its nature as to admit of no other prevention.

The fear of losing the opportunity for distinguishing his outset in arms with a show of success, added to the rancorous desire of murdering your minister who resided on the faith of treaties at His Highness's court, induced the Peishwah to precipitate matters. On his taking the field earlier than his secret confederates expected, they endeavoured to fulfil their compact, though they were by no means prepared. Holkar's government immediately assembled troops, with the proclaimed design of supporting the Peishwah, and marched in the direction of Poona. The concourse to that standard was much greater than could have been expected; notwithstanding which, Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hislop manifested the most exemplary and generous patience, before he took the decision of dispersing that army by force. His Excellency was instructed by me to use every effort of conciliatory representation towards persuading Holkar's Sirdars to abandon their hostile purpose; but should that fail, he was directed to treat Holkar as an enemy. The moderation of Sir Thomas Hislop's tone was construed by the opposite party as proceeding from an apprehension of their strength, and the most contemptuous insults were offered to our troops. The beating down this spirit for the present hour would be of little avail, if a disposition of such gratuitous enmity were not to be restricted in the means of its future indulgence; but beyond this consideration, the displayed and professed obedience to the Peishwah's summons, in breach of existing treaties, exacted strict precautions for our security. As everything which we restored to Holkar, and even the permission for his continuance on the Musnud, was a positive boon, we were thoroughly entitled to appropriate to the Honourable Company, out of the conquered lands, a revenue sufficient to defray the charge of a force, the stationing of which in that quarter, the wanton hostility of Holkar's government, had proved to be an indispensable provision for the future.

The same Mahratta tie which acted so irresistibly upon Holkar's court was as powerful with the Rajah of Nagpore. Our whole conduct towards him had been unvaried kindness; nor had a single point of difference ever arisen in the political transactions between us. The extinction of the Pindarries, who annually plundered his territories, was an object of earnest desire to him. Yet while, with such antecedent reasons for mutual confidence, we were prosecuting that enterprise, he publicly received from the Peishwah (then in arms against us) a khelat with an honorary title, and issued private orders for the levy of troops in all quarters. On being solicited by the Resident to explain the assemblage of troops which was taking place round Nagpore, he with the basest deceit protested his inviolable amity, while he was equipping himself for a profligate outrage to the law of nations, in an attack on our accredited minister at his court. Subsequent events irrefragably proved that no reliance could be placed on him or his people. The option for us was, to leave him with the temptation and the means of fashioning his preparations better for another opportunity, or to bind him to tranquillity by diminishing his resources, and thereby forbidding his hopes of success. The subversion of all the beneficial changes which we have been effecting would have been the early and least injurious consequence of the former branch of the alternative. There was, in truth, no choice. Simple self-defence required us to retain the districts which we had subdued by the action at Jubbulpore, and to maintain in them an advanced force as a permanent curb on Nagpore. To these must be added the territory of Saugor. The sovereignty over that possession was transferred to the Honourable Company by the treaty of Poona; but Benaick Row, the manager of Saugor, in violation of his allegiance, has not "only screened the Pindarries, but permitted the public levy of men in the town of Saugor for the Rajah of Nagpore, after that prince had put himself into a state of open war with us, by the attacks on the British Resident on the 26th and 27th of November.

The conduct of Nana Govind Row, the other claimant on Saugor, though not openly hostile, had been such as to justify our proceeding Against that district, without reference to his pretensions, further than as considerations of policy may suggest a partial attention to his interests.

Whatsoever had been said relative to Holkar and the Rajah of Nagpore, will apply still more forcibly to the Peishwah. As the contest with him is not come to a termination, nothing but the principle can be expressed.

Scindia had not incurred forfeiture, though he has essentially deserved that penalty. I should say, that the very letter of the treaty has been observed to him with even too much strictness, if too much strictness of construction could be observed towards an unequal antagonist. His troops have, in no one instance, impeded the marches of the retreating Pindarries; much less have they contributed any co-operation with us: and his contingent of horse has been withheld under various pretences, until it was no longer of any consequence. Relying on our respect for the obligations of forbearance which the treaty imposed on us, he has hardly disguised that he was watching the course of the Peishwah's affairs, and projected the adoption of measures consonant to any encouragement they might hold out. It is beyond question, that Holkar's taking the field would have been sufficient to decide him, had I not come so rapidly back upon him. From our proximity he knew, that should he stir, I could be upon him, before it would be practicable for him to get his artillery through the passes of the hills which separate the province of Gwalior from the southern districts he would; therefore, be driven to choose, whether he would shut himself up in his fortress of Gwalior with his ordnance, or, leaving it there, betake himself, without artillery, across the ridge. In either case, Gwalior would have been masked with a small entrenched camp, while the occupation of the passes over the hills left the territory behind to be reduced at leisure; and Ameer Khan, with his troops, would have been summoned to take possession of the southern tracts under the protection of our divisions. This Scindia doubtless foresaw, and has escaped: but, though he will still benefit highly by our restitution to him of lands which were held by the Pindarries, he has no claim on our liberality. Those disorders of state which we might have helped him to regulate, and those financial difficulties which we might have smoothed for him, will press him with augmented force, now that we have deprived him of extraneous resources, and his government will probably soon fall to pieces. Should that not happen, a salutary caution against tolerating hereafter any predatory combinations within his dominions, will have been impressed upon him by the chastisement which Jeswunt Rao Bhow has received. That officer commanded a separate army of Scindia's at Jawud. In contempt of the orders publicly delivered to him on the part of Scindia, he not only furnished provisions, and every facilitation of progress, to the body of Pindarries retreating under Cheetoo, but he gave to that chief intelligence of the approach of the British troops, and saved him from being cut off. Our forbearance overlooked this direct hostility: but when we found his practices were continued, in despite of every remonstrance from the officer stationed to superintend his conduct, when we learned that he protected Pindarries and their property in his camp, under the very eye of that officer; when we discovered that, in violation of the treaty, he privately enrolled the troops which seceded from Holkar's army, it became necessary to take up the matter seriously. Major-General Brown, detached with a corps from this division, was ordered to require the surrender of the Pindarries, and of two Sirdars by whom they had been more immediately sheltered. On information that, under the connivance of the Bhow, the two Sirdars with the bodies of horse belonging to them were about to quit the place, carrying off the Pindarries, the Major-General dispatched a squadron of cavalry to get beyond the camp and prevent their flight, while he should renew representations to Jeswunt Rao. The object of this detachment being suspected, our cavalry were fired upon by the Bhow's infantry, and four pieces of cannon were also opened upon them: an aggression which entailed the attack and dispersion of Jeswunt Rao's army, as well as the capture of the town of Jawud. The occurrence has been fortunate; because we could not but be sensible, that had the Bhow remained in possession of power, his force would have been a rallying point for all the plunderers whom we had with such exertion scattered, so as that our interference would have been demanded hereafter, when the moment might have been far less convenient.

The exertions of the Nawab of Bhopaul in supplying with provisions our columns which advanced from the Nerbudda, in aiding towards the expulsion of the Pindarries, and in contributing eight hundred horse to the division of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams throughout the campaign, have been so meritorious that it is impossible to deny him the benefit of British protection. The events which have extended your possessions along the front of Bhopaul so totally extinguish the considerations influencing your objection to receiving it as a feudatory, that I think I cannot err in regarding the prohibition as no longer in force. It is a material barrier between Scindia and Nagpore on that side; while Kota, Boondee, Kerowly, and Holkar's possessions, restrict him along the Chumbul. Those minor states mentioned are countries of great natural strength, and would be vigorously defended, now that their rulers know themselves safe against the danger of ultimately succumbing.

The Rajpoot rulers of Jodepore and Odeypore have by treaty constituted themselves your feudatories; and the Vakeels from the Rajah of Jeypore are now at Delhi, arranging the terms on which that prince is to be admitted to the same relation. The smaller states to the westward will follow of course.

The Honourable Secret Committee, looking forward to the necessity of contracting some such ties, enjoined that such eventual engagements should be restricted to what were distinctly indispensable towards the extirpation of the Pindarries. The objections to an extension of them were obviously two: first the possible expense attending the provisions for fulfilling compacts of that nature; secondly, their tendency to embroil us with other powers. Neither of those consequences are involved in the arrangements which occurrences recommended to my adoption. The States received as feudatory under the Honourable Company's protection will defray a considerable portion of military charge antecedently resting on your treasury; and it will be visible to your Honourable Court, that Scindia, the only remaining sovereign who could have a difference with any of the governments in question, must experience the strongest of all dissuasions against aggression, from the very amount of those powers which we have confederated. I have thence construed the instructions as not applicable to circumstances so little analogous to what had been in the contemplation of the Honourable Committee or of myself. Events, altogether unexpected, presented a juncture which was to be dealt with according to its particular features. Believing that I have availed myself of it in the manner best calculated to ensure future tranquillity, I trust your Honourable Court will approve my procedure, when you consider the certainty that any state, not taken under your protection and guidance, must have afforded to Scindia's detached Sirdars a field for rapine, and would, in its quest for means of self-preservation, have revived a predatory association, by the number of lawless adventurers which it would attract f or its defence without having resources to pay their service. In such a case, an urgent policy must have forced us to an expensive interference, the simple pledge of which will now be sufficient to secure us against the call for its real exertion.

That these complicated concerns have been settled in less than three months since the southern divisions crossed the Nerbudda (the actual opening of the campaign), is an advantage on which I beg leave sincerely to congratulate the Honourable Court. It has been usual to communicate to the Horse-Guards by an aide-de-camp the fortunate result of any considerable operation in which His Majesty's troops have had a share, a brevet step being generally hoped for the individual charged with the intelligence. I assure myself that your Honourable Court will regard the present instance as one which stands exempted from the spirit of your interdict against sending officers to Europe with dispatches, and that you would wish Captain Stanhope (who has the honour of presenting this letter) to have the chance of benefiting by a practice devised to stimulate the activity of generals, through the interest they take in the persons composing their professional suite. Howsoever void of claim to distinction has been the part which I have filled in the late transactions, the courtesy of the service may probably obtain for the aide-de-camp of the Commander-in-Chief a recognition of the success with which a military undertaking of no ordinary extent has been completed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HASTINGS.

Camp at Kinjowlee,
on the banks of the Sinde, 8th February 1818.

From: A. Berriedale Keith, ed. Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy, 1750-1921. Vol. I. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1922, 198-207.