Sir Charles Napier on the Occupation of Sind, 17 October 1842

1. It is not for me to consider how we came to occupy Scinde, but to consider the subject as it now stands, viz. we are here by right of treaties [in 1832 and 1839] entered into by the Ameers, and, therefore we stand on the same footing with themselves, for rights held under a treaty are as sacred as the right which sanctions that treaty.

2. There does not appear any public protest registered by the Ameers against the treaties. They must, therefore, be considered as the free expressions of the will of the contracting parties. Such then is the relative position of the British Government and the Ameers of Scinde at this time.

3. The English occupy Shikarpore, Bukkur, Sukkur, and Kurachee, by treaties, which, if rigidly adhered to by the Ameers, would render these princes more rich and powerful, and their subjects more happy, than they are now.

4. If sticklers for abstract rights maintain-as no doubt they will-that to prevent a man from doing mischief is to enslave him, then it might be called hard to enforce a rigid observance of these treaties; but this is not the case. The evident object of these treaties is to favour our Indian interests, by the abolition of barbarism, by ameliorating the condition of society, and by obliging the Ameers to do, in compliance with treaties, that which honourable and civilized rulers would do of their own accord. It is very necessary to keep this fact in view, because, although the desire to do good would not sanction a breach of treaty on our part, it does sanction our exacting a rigid adherence to the treaties on the part of the Ameers; and the more so, that their attempt to break such treaties, evinces the barbarism of those princes, their total want of feeling for their subjects, and their own unfitness to govern a country. These things must be always kept before the mind, or what I am about to say will appear unjust, which is not the case.

5. By treaty, the time for which we may occupy our present camps is unlimited; but there is such hostility to us on the part of the Ameers--such a hatred to the treaties--such a resolution to break them in every way; there is, among their people, such a growing attachment to the British rule, that putting these facts together, the question arises, whether we should abandon the interests of humanity, and those of the British Government (for in this case they are one), and at once evacuate Scinde; or, shall we take advantage of existing treaties and maintain our camps permanently ?

6. If we evacuate this country, future events will inevitably bring us back to the banks of the Indus.

7. If we remain, our camps will soon be filled with the subjects of the Ameers, flying from their oppression. These camps will thus quickly grow into towns, and the people within will carry on a transit trade along the Indus, to the exclusion of the subjects of the Ameers without. Among the latter, misery and poverty will sojourn; for the exactions of the Ameers will, in a great measure destroy both commerce and agriculture among their people. Such appears to be the probable result, if we adhere rigidly to the Treaty, and permanently occupy our camps.

8. This produces another question, viz. is it possible that such a state of things can long continue? A Government hated by its subjects, despotic, hostile alike to the interests of the English and of its own people; a Government of low intrigue, and, above all so constituted that it must, in a few years, fall to pieces by the vice of its own construction; will such a government, I ask, not maintain an incessant petty hostility against us? Will it not incessantly commit breaches of treaties-those treaties by which alone we have any right to remain in this country, and therefore must rigidly uphold? I conceive that such a state of political relations could not last, and that the more powerful government would at no very distant period swallow up the weaker.

9. If this reasoning be correct, would it not be better to come to the results at once? I think it would be better if it can be done with honesty. Let me first consider how we might go to work in a matter so critical, and whether the facts, to which I called your attention in a former part of these observations, will bear me out in what I propose.

10. Several Ameers have broken the Treaty in the various instances stated in the accompanying 'Return of Complaints' against them. I have maintained that we want only a fair pretext to coerce the Ameers, and I think the various acts recorded in the return give abundant reason to take Kurachee, Sukkur, Bukkur, Shikarpore, and Subzulkote, for our own; obliging the Ameers to leave a trackway along both banks of the Indus, and stipulate for a supply of wood; but at the same time, remitting all tribute, and arrears of tribute, in favour of those Ameers whose conduct has been correct; and, finally, enter into a fresh treaty with one of these Princes alone as chief, and answerable for the others.

11. I cannot think that such a procedure would be either dishonourable, or harsh. I am sure it would be humane. The refractory Ameers break the Treaty for the gratification of their avaricious dispositions, and we punish that breach. I can perceive no injustice in such proceeding.

12. If it be determined to keep possession of Sukkur and Bukkur, I do not think it would be politic to give up Shikarpore; my reasons for this opinion are as follows: The town of Sukkur stands on an elbow of the Indus, which surrounds the town on two sides; on the other two, at about four miles distance, it is closed in by a large jungle, through which passes the road to Shikarpore where the jungle finishes. Now, if we evacuate Shikarpore, the robber tribes will descend from the hills, and establish themselves in this jungle, so that Sukkur will be blockaded; and no one be able to move beyond the chain of sentries, without being murdered. To clear this jungle with infantry would be impossible; the robbers would retreat before the advancing troops and, when the latter retired again, the former would again occupy the position in the jungle. But, if we occupy Shikarpore, a body of cavalry stationed there would spread along the outskirt of the jungle, while infantry would (by concert) push through the wood from Sukkur. The robbers, thus cut off from their hills, would receive such a terrible punishment, as to deter any other tribe from trying the same experiment.

13. In a commercial point, I consider Shikarpore to be of considerable importance. It forms a dépôt for the reception of goods from the north and west, with which countries it has long possessed channels of communication; circumstances of an adverse nature may for a while interrupt these, but under a firm protecting Government, they would soon be again opened out, and from Shikarpore goods would be sent to Sukkur, there to be shipped on the Indus, and would also be passed by land to Larkhana, and thence on to Kurachee. These seem formerly to have been the great lines of trade. They are geographically and naturally so, and will, therefore, quickly revive. But if Shikarpore be left to the mercy of the surrounding gangs of freebooters, commerce cannot thrive, nor, without Shikarpore be strongly guarded, can it pass through the jungle to Sukkur. These two towns are so placed as naturally to support each other in commerce.

14. In a political light Shikarpore has the advantage of being chiefly inhabited by a Hindoo population, tolerated for ages by the Mussulmans, and, consequently, forming a pacific link of intercourse between us and the nations north and west; through Shikarpore, these Hindoos will be the means of gradually filtering the stream of commerce and social intercourse between the Mahomedans and ourselves, and, in time, unite those who will not abruptly amalgamate. Shikarpore contains many rich banking houses, which is a sure evidence of its being a central point of communication between the surrounding countries, and, consequently, one where the British Government would learn what was going on in Asia. The money market is, generally speaking, the best political barometer.

15. The robber tribes in this neighbourhood have kept down this town in despite of its natural and acquired advantages; in fact, the robber is everywhere the master. Therefore all around is barbarous, and barbarous must continue to be, till civilization gradually encroaches upon these lawless people; and, I think, Shikarpore is precisely one of those grand positions that ought to be seized upon for that purpose. I have, therefore, directed Major-General England not to evacuate this town till further instructions are received from the Governor-General.

16. I shall keep this memorandum till the arrival of Major Outram, and will request of him to peruse it, that he may give his opinion upon the view which I have taken; an opinion, which his experience of these countries, his abilities, and the high situation in which he has been placed by the Governor-General, all render very important. If Major Outram concurs in the opinions which I have ventured to express they will be strengthened, if not, the Governor-General will be made acquainted with the objections of one possessing great local knowledge.

17. I have drawn up this memorandum entirely on my own consideration of the subject; but since Major Outram's arrival, which took place when I finished the last paragraph, he has given me every possible assistance. He concurs in all I have said in the foregoing paragraphs, but, at the same time, he has added much to my local knowledge, and in justice to the Ameers, I must, with this increase of information, enlarge upon what I have stated. The Ameers say, that they did not understand Article XI of the treaty with Hyderabad to prohibit the levying of tolls on their own subjects. It seems that they urge, in proof of their misconception, that they resisted the signing the Treaty, because of other Articles, less important, yet never objected to Article XI, because they relied upon Article V. This may be, and I would willingly, if possible, suppose that they really did conceive that the Treaty gave them the right of levying tolls on their own subjects; but my answer is, that they have attempted to levy tolls on the boats of the Khan of Bhawulpore, which the Treaty assuredly does not give them any right to do; and they have even fired into the boats of merchants from that place. The Treaty could not be misconstrued on these points, and, therefore, I do not believe that they misconstrued the terms of the Treaty, but broke Article XI purposely. The Treaty has also been broken by treasonable correspondence, and other vexatious acts, as set forth in the accompanying return.

18. Now, what will be the punishment which I propose to inflict for their misconduct, amount to? Injury to their family? No! Injury to their subjects? No! To what then? To the reduction of their territory by four places; two of which (Sukkur and Bukkur) are barred spots, yielding no revenue; and the other two (Kurachee and Shikarpore) towns that their tyranny has nearly ruined, and for one of which, Shikarpore, we have negotiations pending, yet to obtain these places in seignorage, it is proposed to remit all tribute in arrear, and, for the future, withdraw our resident from Hyderabad, ensure the amelioration of the impoverished state, in which their subjects now languish, and, in time add to the power and wealth of the Ameers themselves, by opening the commerce of the river.

19. To their selfish feelings and avarice, and love of hunting, are such great general interests to be sacrificed? I think not; the real interests of the Ameers themselves demand that their puerile pursuits and blind avaricious proceedings should be subjected to a wholesale control, which their breaches of treaties, and our power, give us, at this moment, a lawful right to exercise, and the means of peaceably enforcing. If any civilized man were asked the question, 'were you the ruler of Scinde, what would you do?' his answer would be 'I would abolish the tolls upon the rivers, make Kurachee a free port, protect Shikarpore from robbers, make Sukkur a mart for trade on the Indus. I would make a track-way along its banks; I would get steam-boats.' Yet all this is what the Ameers dread.

20. They have broken treaties, they have given a pretext, and I have a full conviction (perhaps erroneously) that what I propose is just and humane. I will go further, and say that, as Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad has openly broken the Treaty, if the Governor-General chooses to punish him, he might justly seize the district of Subzulkote, and give it to the Khan of Bhawulpore, as I have understood there was some intention of doing.

21. The second point to which Major Outram has drawn my attention is a very strong one. He tells me that the tribes on the river above that part possessed by the Ameers of Scinde, do levy tolls, and that there is no treaty or public document forthcoming, in virtue of which we can call upon the Ameers, of even Upper Scinde, not to levy tolls upon their own subjects. It is therefore. evident, that to call upon the Ameers of Hyderabad to desist from levying tolls, and to allow the tribes above them on the river to do so, would be unjust ; that is to say, it would be unjust to allow the others to levy tolls, but not unjust to prevent the Ameers from doing so. The answer to the argument: 'That tolls are levied on the Northern Indus' is just this: we should say to these northern tribes, 'We have with great trouble secured, to your boats a free passage on the river through Scinde; we are resolved to open the commerce of this great highway of nations; and you, who all receive benefit, must join in this great measure for the good of all, and to the loss of none.['] Therefore, to excuse the Ameers upon the ground that others are not equally coerced, is answered by coercing the others.

22. Having thus given the best view that I can take of this intricate subject, I shall accompany this report by various documents, among which there is one giving a kind of return, if I may so call it, of the accusations against the Ameers, upon which accusations, relative to which I have read every paper, I have founded my opinion of their conduct, and, by referring to this return it will be seen whether I have justly estimated le com- plaints made against them by the Political Agents.

23. I have also added the documents verifying each transaction. I have also begged of Major Outram to give me a memorandum of the state in which the Treaty with the Ameers, for the purchase of Shikarpore, remains, as it has been in abeyance since last year. From this memorandum it would appear, that in addition to the great advantages to Sukkur, which would attend the occupation of Shikarpore, this district would be a very valuable acquisition, in point of revenue, in time; and could with the aid of Kurrachee, meet the expense of guarding our newly acquired towns on the banks of the Indus.

24. Should it hereafter be deemed proper to make the proposed arrangements with the Ameers, so as to punish those who have broken the treaty, the details of such arrangements can be easily made. The transfer of tribute due would adequately repay whatever portions of the districts in question belong to the Ameers, whose conduct had been loyal, when compared with that of the others.

From: A. Berriedale Keith, ed. Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy, 1750-1921. Vol. I. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1922, 274-284.