No. 120 195/139184-87

U. St.S. Pol. 661                                                                                               

BERLIN, July 17, 1941.

M. Bose called on me today after his return. [Following his visit to Germany the Indian Nationalist leader, Subhas Chandra Bose, had gone to Rome on May 29 (see vol. XII of this series, document No. 561 and footnotes 3 and 4). In a memorandum of July 10 (195/139182-83) Woermann recorded having received a letter from Bose who announced that he was coming to Germany and would arrive in Berlin by July 14 at the latest. In this letter of July 5, which is attached to Woermann's memorandum, Bose remarked that his talk with Ciano was not encouraging and that prospects for the realization of his plans looked gloomy as a result of the outbreak of war in the east.]

I first informed him regarding the tasks assigned to State Secretary Keppler. After his visit with me M. Bose called on Herr Keppler.

Bose first spoke in detail concerning the repercussions of the German-Russian war on public opinion in India. The Soviet Union had been popular in India, especially among the intelligentsia, from which the leader group came, because in India they believed that the Soviet Union was an anti-imperialist power and thus the natural ally of India against England. The German-Russian pact of 1939 had been a climax for India. It had made it possible for the basically anti-National Socialist intelligentsia now to regard Germany and Italy as those powers which, in friendship with the Soviet Union, would put an end to the British rule in India, although the British propaganda had succeeded in preserving hostile feelings against the Axis Powers in large parts of India. In the German-Russian war the feelings of the Indian people were very decidedly on the Russian side, because the Indian people were sure that Germany was the aggressor and thus also an imperialist power dangerous to India. Even after a complete German victory over Russia it would be difficult to change public opinion in India in this regard.

At the same time Bose expects-and there are already reports from London confirming this-that England will now carry out reforms in India that will make it appear inviting to that portion of public opinion which is always inclined to compromises to continue to bet on the English, while at the same time the danger of a German attack on India is pictured; not in the sense of a liberation of the Indian people but of a replacement of British rule by German rule.

Bose expects that India will become even more than before a center for the development of British military power and considers it very probable that England will advance not through Afghanistan but through Iran in order to seize first the oil fields and then to join hands with the Soviet Union in the Caucasus region.

Bose's statements indicated that, away from Berlin, he is strongly influenced by the Soviet thesis even in the question of the origin of the German-Russian conflict, so that it will be one of the first tasks to set him right. on this point.

I told Bose that we adhered unchanged to the intention of a proclamation in favor of a free India; naturally a favorable moment had to be chosen for this. [See vol. XII of this series, document No.553.]

At this point M. Bose became very excited and asked that the Foreign Minister be told that this proclamation should be issued as quickly as possible. Every day that passed gave England the lead with the projected measures of reform in India, whereas on the other hand he did not see any reason for holding back the proclamation. However, he could understand that the moment had to be chosen by judging the situation as a whole.

I did not deal in detail in our short conversation with the other current questions, in particular with that of preparations here for the establishment of a free India center. [In English in the original] It was obvious, however, that for Bose these questions are of lesser interest as long as he does not have the certainty that the declaration regarding a free India will be issued.

I refer also to the report of July 13 from the German Embassy in Rome and the memorandum of the Italian Foreign Minister contained therein regarding Bose's conversations in Rome. [Report No.61r.(41/28496; 28498-501).]The idea discussed there in point 4, of keeping Bose in reserve in a neutral country for a later suitable moment, appears to me to be inapt.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister. Proposals for the further treatment of the questions concerned are being prepared by State Secretary Keppler and me.

WOERMANN

From: US Department of State. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Series D (1937-1945). Vol. XIII. The War Years June 23-December 11, 1941. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1964, 165-167.