Conversation Between Bose and the German Foreign Minister, 29 November 1941

No. 521 F12/138-129

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
[A draft of this memorandum with handwritten corrections (Fl/0037-46) which were incorporated in the finished copy printed here is also in the files.]

RAM 59 g. Rs.                                                                                            

BERLIN, November 29, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF M. BOSE WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON NOVEMBER 29, 1941, IN BERLIN

[According to a memorandum by Woermann of Nov. 22 (195/139258) the Foreign Minister had promised that he would receive Bose the next time he would be in Berlin. "The reception appears to be the more necessary as the Grand Mufti is to be received by the Führer in the presence of the Foreign Minister and as Bose and the Grand Mufti are in continuous contact with one another."]

M. Bose began the conversation with words of thanks for the hospitality he had enjoyed in Germany and the request that his mission be supported. He congratulated the Foreign Minister on his speech and stated that the tone adopted in it had been very precisely attuned to England and America. [Delivered on Nov.26 at a banquet celebrating the prolongation of the Anti-Comintern Pact. For text, see Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik, December 1944, pp. 1053-1068.] In general he termed the situation hopeful, and believed that he could reckon Germany's prospects of winning the war at about 80 percent. He did not attribute any particular importance for the development of the war to America's entry, but said that Germany now had to take up the Oriental question, particularly as [action in] the European theater of war would be finished within the foreseeable future.

The English had prepared a broader base in India. Whereas in the last war they had in the main procured manpower from India, the country had now been much more industrialized and especially adapted to the production of war material, so that all the fronts in the Orient could be supplied from there. England was so easy to attack in her Empire, and had enemies everywhere (Iraq, Iran, etc.). He, M. Bose, watched the English propaganda very closely; as an example he cited Colonel Britten [Colonel Britton], who was carrying on particularly realistic propaganda of subversion. Here the German propaganda ought to start its effort in a similar way; he expected this to have great success all over the Orient, which would greatly facilitate the work of the Wehrmacht.

It was a very important point that Germany should decide in time which party she wanted to cooperate with in each country. A prompt decision would then make it possible for the organization concerned to cooperate effectively.

M. Bose then showed several clippings from the Times, the Daily Mail, and the Daily Express, which branded him a traitor. He indicated that it was rather necessary to make a reply to this so that his followers would not defect.

In his reply the Foreign Minister pointed out that the war, as he had already told him in Vienna, would result in the destruction of the English possessions everywhere in the world. [See vol. XII of this series, document No. 425.] Churchill knew, to be sure, that the war was lost, but could not and would not admit it; furthermore, there was no leader of stature to replace him. Thus he continued to make war. True, he could not be termed a great statesman; his sole strength lay in the fact that he was willing to take over the responsibility for continuing the war and that he succeeded in bringing about a certain agreement between the Labour Party and the Conservatives which others did not feel capable of achieving. It was improbable that Churchill would be overthrown; it was conceivable, however, in case the current operation in North Africa should lead to an English defeat.

As far as Russia was concerned, this would still require some effort, to be sure, but she would fall in the course of the coming year at the latest. The Russians had arrived at the point where they could not themselves replace their armaments adequately, while Anglo-American support was too scanty. In the meantime the English would lose one position after the other; this time the Führer wanted to have a clear decision and would no longer consider any compromise. It seemed that relations between Japan and America would reach a, state of tension in the next few days which would at least result in a serious situation and perhaps also war.

In England Bevin [Ernest Bevin, British Minister of Labour and National Service.] was important in domestic policy; actually a half-Bolshevik, he was something of an English Kerensky. One could assume it to be certain that the Conservatives would no longer be in power at the end of the war. The more England lost, the more the course turned toward the left. America, would be the heir to the English possessions in the Western Hemisphere, whereas the Axis would predominate in Europe. Once Germany had the Russian space before her as an area for colonization, she would hardly need colonies. Certainly the Russian area would be successfully colonized. In Africa, where the Duce would have a great influence, the English would be driven out and the peoples there would be given greater freedom. He, the Foreign Minister, had just seen the Mufti, who wanted to create a new Arab world, whereas Japan also had certain justified claims in the Far East. [See document No. 514]

In the question of India it was important to realize that the collapse of the Empire could no longer be prevented. One important point had to be taken into account, however: German policy did not think much of declarations with no force behind them, because it was possible that the opposite effect from the one desired could occur. As an example the Foreign Minister pointed to Iraq, where German was unable to help. The result was that the Grand Mufti and Gaylani were in Germany, the Government was forced into exile, and its friends were dead or in prison. After that the Syrian venture had occurred, with a similar outcome. Germany wanted to avoid taking a step which could again induce certain circles to ill-considered actions. Thus no open action should be taken that could endanger the situation. When we would be in a position to put pressure behind a declaration, and this time was no longer very far off, then we would take action. For the moment we intended to carry on all sorts of propaganda for the Arabs, for instance, but not to issue any declaration.

In the case of India matters were not entirely analogous. There, too, however, one should proceed cautiously and only say something concrete when a success was in view, for example when German troops had crossed the Caucasus. Then one might consider setting up an all-India committee under M. Bose in Tiflis, for example, which would make propaganda efforts with a large expenditure and with radio transmitters.

One thing was certain, that propaganda alone would never bring about a free India or Arabia; this could only be achieved through the destruction of the English positions of power by the Wehrmaeht. At the moment England held all of these countries through her prestige; once this had been destroyed the Empire would fall.
Here M. Bose interjected that he hoped that this view of the Foreign Minister's also reflected the Führer's view.

The Foreign Minister said that the Führer believed in the final defeat of England; it was simply his view, however, that no action should take place until Germany had the power to support it properly. One should not risk the possibility of our propaganda's being torn to shreds by English counterpropaganda.

M. Bose pointed out that the Indian question differed from the Arab question in two points:

1. India was much further away. Therefore the English propaganda was much more effective there, for the Indians had no contact of any sort with Germany and no conception of Germany.

2. In Mein Kampf there were passages in regard to India which had been exploited in an unfavorable sense by English propaganda. It was by far the most important thing to let the Indian people know what the Führer thought about India, because the Indian people did not know either Germany or the views held there. Technically such influence could probably be exerted through the radio.

The Foreign Minister stated that he had been thinking about an audience with the Führer for M. Bose; but at the moment he still hesitated to suggest this to the Führer because such a visit might become known. At the moment it was probably also too soon to undertake such decisive steps. At the proper time propaganda would be started against all the positions of the British Empire, possibly also including South Africa, so as to proceed with the strongest possible means against the Empire. However, he wanted to intensify the broadcasts to India and for this reason asked M. Bose for ideas he might suggest.

M. Bose pointed out that there were millions of persons living in India who were anti-English, to be sure, but not for that reason pro-German. The great problem lay in the possibility of winning over these forces.

The Foreign Minister repeated his request for suggestions, and added that the moment would then have arrived when German troops were beyond the Caucasus and at Suez. The Axis could speak only when the military had a firm basis in the Near East, for otherwise any propaganda effect would come to nought. It was a guiding principle of German policy not to promise anything that could not be carried out later. As far as the English method was concerned, the Foreign Minister pointed to the concept of "Blitzkrieg", which had been formulated in England so that one could say in the case of every German campaign, no matter how short, that it had failed as a Blitzkrieg. He imagined propaganda for India from this standpoint: The English oppress all nations, and Germany will help all those oppressed.

M. Bose asked to consider whether a secret radio transmitter for India should not be established. [An unsigned and undated summary of various points made by Bose in this conversation (F1/0047-49) indicates that Bose proposed to have the transmitter set up in Zemum near Belgrade.] He would then direct the propaganda of this transmitter without himself making an appearance. Following this he asked the Foreign Minister to arrange an audience with the Führer, nevertheless, so that he would have the opportunity of personally presenting his views to him.

The Foreign Minister closed the conversation with the promise to consider this question. [Bose was not received by Hitler until May 27, 1942 (Schmidt memorandum of May 30:F18/0232-47).]

Von Loesch

From: US Department of State. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Series D (1937-1945). Vol. XIII. The War Years June 23-December 11, 1941. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1964, 896-900.