Project South Asia

Note of the Government of India to the Chinese Government, 12 February 1960

The Embassy of India presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to the Chinese Government's Note handed on the 26th December, 1959, to the Embassy of India in Peking. In reply, the Embassy has been directed by the Government of India to state as follows:

2. The Government of India regret that the Chinese Government have not fully considered the various points raised in the Prime Minister of India's letter of September 26, 1959 to the Chinese Premier and in the Note handed by the Ministry of External Affairs to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China on November 4, 1959. The Government of China have merely reiterated their claims to vast areas of Indian territory and ignored the facts mentioned in the letter. It was the earnest hope of the Government of India that a proper appreciation of the facts and historical data presented by them in support of their stand regarding the boundary would pave the way for an amicable settlement by narrowing down the issues for discussion. The Government of India have to state with regret, however, that the Government of China in their Note not only do not accept incontrovertible facts but disregard major frontier Agreements by untenable interpretation of their terms or by questioning their validity. Such an approach can hardly lead to an understanding which both countries desire.

3. The Government of China contend that the Sino-Indian boundary has not been formally delimited and in support of that contention allege that the boundary has not been determined by treaties and agreements. The Government of India cannot accept this contention. The Sino-Indian boundary, based on custom and tradition, follows natural features, and for the major part this customary and traditional boundary is also confirmed by treaty and agreement. This boundary throughout has been fixed and well-known for centuries. According to international usage and practice a customary boundary which follows well-known and unchanging natural features like main watersheds stands defined and does not require further or formal definition. It is significant that until recently no Chinese Government ever challenged it, or protested against the exercise of the sovereign jurisdiction of India up to this traditional boundary. In view of all these facts, the Government of India cannot agree that negotiations have to be conducted to reach new agreements for fresh determination of the Sino-Indian boundary.

4. The Government of China have stated that the present controversy has arisen because "the Sino-Indian boundary has never been delimited, Britain left behind in this respect a heritage of certain disputes and more-over the Indian Government has made a series of unacceptable charges against China". The Government of India cannot accept either the assertions or the imputations contained in this statement. In fact the present controversy regarding the boundary and the tension on the border have arisen because the Chinese Government laid claims to extensive areas of Indian territory for the first time on September 8, 1959, and intruded into Indian territory, both before and afterwards, in furtherance of their claims. The Government of India are particularly surprised and shocked by this attitude and action of a neighbour whose friendship they have always cherished. Despite these unwelcome developments, the Government and the people of India have shown the utmost restraint. They have always been willing to explore the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. But an amicable settlement cannot be reached on the basis that a new agreement has to be negotiated to determine afresh the entire Sino-Indian boundary. Such a basis for negotiations would ignore past history, custom, tradition and international agreements and is, therefore, entirely unacceptable to the Government of India. The Government of India wish to state again that they are prepared to discuss specific disputes in regard to the location of particular places on the boundary, and to make minor frontier rectifications by agreement, where they may be considered necessary.

5. The following paragraphs give in brief the basic data in regard to the international boundary. They also deal with the arguments advanced by the Chinese Government in their Note of December 26, 1959.

6. Taking the Ladakh sector first, it is wrong to say, as the Chinese Government have done, that according to the Government of India the boundary of Ladakh was fixed by the Treaty of 1842. In fact the boundaries of Ladakh were fixed and well recognised from the 17th century onwards. The 1842 Treaty did not fix the boundary but merely confirmed it. That this traditional boundary lay where Indian maps are showing it is confirmed by those who visited this area in the 19th century. The Government of China have quoted unofficial maps published by Hayward in 1870 and Robert Shaw in 1871, as well as an article by Hayward, to prove their contention that the traditional eastern boundary of Ladakh lay where the Chinese maps are now showing it. Hayward, however, surveyed only the western extremity of Aksai Chin, and Shaw's route lay even further westwards. Their opinions, therefore, are not authoritative for eastern Aksai Chin. The latter area was surveyed by Johnson in 1865 and visited by the second Yarkand Mission in 1873. It is their reports, therefore, that are authoritative in regard to the eastern boundary of Ladakh, and their maps and accounts substantiate the traditional Indian alignment.

7. The Chinese Government assert that the 1842 Treaty was between Tibet and Kashmir whereas about 80 per cent of the area now claimed by them is part of Sinkiang. The Government of India are surprised at this contention. Prime Minister Nehru has already dealt with this point in his letter of September 26. The Treaty itself makes it clear that China was a party to it. The following quotation from the Treaty is relevant:

"Now that in the presence of God, the ill-feeling created by the war which had intervened, has been fully removed from the hearts, and no complaints now remain (on either side), there will never be on any account in future, till the world lasts, any deviation even by the hair's breadth and any breach in the alliance, friendship and unity between the King of the world Siri Khalsaji Sahib and Siri Maharai Sahib Raja-i-Rajagan (Raja of Rajas) Raja Sahib Bahadur, and the Khagan (Emperor) of China and the Lama Guru Sahib, of Lhaszi. We shall remain in possession of the limits of the boundaries of Ladakh and the neighbourhood sub-ordinate to it, in accordance with the old custom, and there shall be no transgression and no interference (in the country) beyond the old established frontiers. We shall hold to our own respective frontiers."

In fact, the treaty was concluded to terminate a war in which Tibet had appealed to China for assistance against Kashmir. The statement in the Chinese note that 80 per cent. of the area was part of Sinkiang in 1842 is unfounded. Even Chinese maps of the 18th and 19th centuries show clearly that Sinkiang never extended south of the Kuen Lun mountains.

8. The Chinese Government state that nothing came of the proposal in 1899 "to delimit the boundary". This again shows a failure to take into account the facts as stated in the Prime Minister of India's letter of September 26, 1959. It was clearly stated in that letter that the proposal made in 1899 by the British referred not to the eastern frontier of Ladakh with Tibet but to the northern frontier of Ladakh with Sinkiang. That proposal stated explicitly that the northern boundary ran along the Kuen Lun range to a point east of 80 degrees east longitude, where it met the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This showed beyond doubt that the whole of the Aksai Chin area lay in Indian territory, and the Government of China did not object to this definition of the boundary. If nothing came of the proposal of 1899, it was not because the Chinese Government declined to recognise the boundary according to the traditional alignment shown on Indian maps, but because even then they did not seem to consider necessary any formal definition of the well-known boundary in this area.

9. The Government of India never contended that the boundary had been explicitly defined in 1842 or 1899. Indeed formal definition or demarcation is not necessary for recognition of a boundary so long as it is fixed by custom and tradition and is well-known. The Chinese Government state that there is much indisputable evidence to show that this sector of the Sino-Indian boundary was not delimited. In fact the evidence that they have brought forward shows only that the boundary was not demarcated on the ground. The proposals of the then British Indian Government between 1921 and 1927 were merely for the determination of the ownership of a few pasture grounds in one particular area. There was no dispute about the main alignment, let alone a demand for its determination. The letter of Sir Arthur Lothian in The Times of December 11, 1959 has been quoted in this context. But this letter referred to an effort to secure delimitation "on the ground"-i.e., demarcation. The map published by the Survey of India in 1950 showed this boundary as "undefined", to indicate that this sector had never been described in detail from point to point or demarcated on the ground. The statement of the Prime Minister in the Lok Sabha on the 28th August, 1959, that the boundary had not been marked, indicated merely that it had not been marked on the ground.

10. The Chinese Government contend that, except for the Demchok (Parigas) area, which according to them has been "occupied" by India in recent years, the rest of the area in Ladakh, claimed by China, has always belonged to her and has been under her effective control. These contentions are wholly baseless. That the Demchok area has for centuries been a part of Ladakh is proved by the treaty between Ladakh and Tibet signed in 1684, and by the accounts of travellers who visited the area thereafter. As for the rest of the area, it is wrong to state that the major part of it was under the jurisdiction of Sinkiang. As already mentioned above, Chinese maps of the 18th and 19th centuries make clear that Sinkiang never extended south of the Kuen Lun mountains. So, no part of this area could ever have been a part of Sinkiang. Nor was any portion of this territory a part of Rudok Dzong of Tibet. Moorcroft, who visited this area in 1820, stated that Paingong Lake divided the district of Rudok from the principality of Ladakh. This in effect conforms with the traditional alignment as shown on Indian maps rather than that shown on Chinese maps. Strachey, who visited this area as a Boundary Commissioner in 1847, gave a more specific alignment, which is essentially in consonance with the alignment on Indian maps.

11. It is most regrettable that the Chinese Government should have claimed, without bringing forward any evidence in support, that their people have utilized this area for pasturage and salt-mining. In fact, the pastures and salt-mines referred to have always been the preserve of Ladakhi villagers who have regularly visited these areas; and these villagers never came across any Chinese trespassers. It is incorrect to say that since 1750 the Chinese Government has established checkposts to exercise jurisdiction over and patrol this area. There were never any Chinese outposts south of the Kuen Lun mountains. Throughout the twentieth century, officials of the Kashmir Government and Indian traders and hunting parties moved freely in this area and they did not come across any evidence of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Chinese in that area. During these years, a detailed geological survey of the whole area was carried out by the Governments of Kashmir and of India. It is only in recent years that Chinese personnel have intruded into this territory; and the Government of India are astonished that the Chinese Government use this intrusion as the basis for their claim. The statement that Indian personnel came into this territory only thrice, and that too in recent times-in September 1958, in July 1959 and in October 1959-is unwarranted by facts. Indian personnel have patrolled this area regularly. Only on the three occasions mentioned by the Chinese Government did they come across Chinese troops.

12. It is strange that the Chinese Government should have brought forward an argument based on philology and advanced a claim on the fact that names such as Aksai Chin and Karakash are of Uighur origin. It is not necessary to treat this argument seriously. The Government of India will content themselves with drawing attention to the fact that centuries ago Indian influence swept deep into China, and there are place names in Tibet and Sinkiang of Sanskrit or Prakrit origin. The name Khotan itself is derived from the Sanskrit word Kustana. Again, the present name of the Ari district of Tibet is an abbreviation of the Sanskrit term Nari in Nari (Ngari) Khorsum, a name by which Western Tibet is known.

13. The Chinese Government have stated in their latest note that the delineation of the boundaries of Ladakh in Chinese maps for the past 200 Years have in the main been consistent. This is certainly true of the Chinese maps published up to the twenties of the present century, but these maps consistently showed a boundary which was more or less in consonance with the traditional alignment as shown on Indian maps. It is only on Chinese maps published since the late twenties that different alignments have been shown. The broad trend in the recent Chinese maps has been to push the alignment deeper into Indian territory.

14. It is extraordinary that the Chinese Government should not be aware of their own official maps such as the one drawn in 1893, and that they should brush aside, The New Atlas and Commercial Gazetteer of China as the publication of a private agency. It was in fact based on authoritative official surveys as stated in the introduction. However, the Government of India would like to draw the attention of the Government of China to the Postal Map of China published in 1917 by the Chinese Government. This map shows the whole northern boundary of India more or less according to the traditional Indian alignment.

15. The Government of China attach little importance to the fact that the alignment shown on Indian maps runs along the main watershed. They seem unaware that traditional boundaries in mountainous areas tend to follow the main watershed rather than any other natural feature. This is because a watershed is the best of all possible natural boundaries. It is liable to no change and is readily recognisable. Where there are a series of mountain ranges, it is the watershed range rather than any other that becomes the traditional boundary, because the peoples on both sides tend to settle up to the sources of rivers but not beyond. That the alignment of the northern boundary of India throughout follows the major watershed supports the fact that this became the boundary through custom and tradition. The argument of the Chinese Government that the watershed boundary of Ladakh is vitiated by the fact that a river breaks through it, is untenable. There is hardly any major watershed in the world, however high and continuous, which is not pierced by some river; but that does not make it any less of a watershed. Equally untenable is the other argument that the alignment shown on Chinese maps is supported by the fact that the area now claimed by the Chinese Government is easily approached from the Chinese side and not from the Indian side. Accessibility is not a criterion for determining the alignment of boundaries.

16. The Government of India are glad to note the acceptance by the Government of China that the alignment of the boundary as shown on Indian maps between the Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh in India and the Tibet "conforms to reality". This alignment conforms to the watershed principle and Chinese maps have also shown this alignment for the greater part of its length. The Government of India, however, reject the claim of the Chinese Government to certain areas in his sector-the Spiti area, Shipki pass, Nilang-Jadhang, Barahoti, Sangchamalla and Lapthal. The Prime Minister of India in his letter of September 26, 1959 has given sufficient data to show that these territories have always been part of India. The Chinese Government have ignored these precise data and have merely repeated their claim. In the circumstances the Government of India consider it unnecessary to repeat their earlier statements.

17. The Government of China have also accused the Government of India of having occupied Puling-Sumdo, one of the markets for trade in the Ari district of Tibet, specified in the 1954 Agreement. The Government of India repudiate this allegation. They are not, and never have been, in occupation of this place. The Chinese Government are confusing this trade mart with a locality in the Nilang-Jadhang area in India called Pulamsumda. This latter place in India, however, has never been a trade mart. The co-ordinates of Puling-Sumdo (also known as Poling) are 31º 19' north and 79º 27' east, and these co-ordinates were communicated by Mr. Kaul with his letter of March 26, 1954 to Mr. Chen Chia Kang. The co-ordinates of Pulamsumda are 31º 18' north and 79º 8' east. During the negotiations leading to the 1954 Agreement it was Puling-Sumdo (Poling) which was mentioned since it was a traditional trade mark. It was then made clear to the Chinese delegation that Puling-Sumdo, and Poling were different names for the same place. There was no occasion to refer to Pulamsumda (31º 18' north and 79º 8' east) and no reference was in fact made to it either in the discussions or in the subsequent Agreement. There should, therefore, be no room for misunderstanding.

18. The Chinese Government contend that the Tibetan authorities are in possession of land deeds and census and taxation papers concerning these areas which they are claiming, and give as an example a document of the eighteenth century concerning Barahoti. The Government of India are somewhat surprised to know of this. During the prolonged discussions on Barahoti which took place in New Delhi in 1958 between the Chinese and Indian delegations, the Chinese delegation did not refer to the existence of such documents. It will be recalled that the Indian delegation stated at the time that they had revenue records and other evidence in their favour.

19. The Government of India cannot accept the contention of the Chinese Government that these areas belong to China because their inhabitants are of Tibetan origin. Indeed, such arguments based on ethnic affinities had been rebutted by Premier Chou En-lai himself as early as July 1957. Addressing the Fourth Session of the National People's Congress at Peking on July 9, 1957, Premier Chou En-lai said: "The boundary question has a direct bearing on the interests of the nationalities living in compact communities on the Sino-Burmese borders. Therefore, in tackling this question we must specially take into account the interests of these nationalities. We know that the boundary line between two countries is often found dividing into two parts a nationality living in compact communities on the borders. This is the result of historical development. On the various sections of the defined boundary between China and Burma and on the border between China and other countries we find people of the same nationality living on both sides of the boundary line. So, when we solve the question of the undefined boundary line between China and Burma, we must realise beforehand that it will be hard to avoid separating the nationalities concerned by the boundary line." India is a State in which people of different races and creeds enjoy common citizenship. There are thousands of Indian citizens of Tibetan origin. The study of the Tibetan language is encouraged by the Government of India. These Indians of Tibetan origin have always been loyal citizens of India.

20. The Government of India cannot accept that the Agreement signed in 1954 between India and China bad no bearing on the question of the boundary between the two countries. It is true that during the negotiations neither side asked to discuss the boundary question. The Indian delegation did not raise it because, so far as the Government of India were concerned, the boundary was well-known and beyond dispute, and there could be no question regarding it. Not only was the boundary shown on official Indian maps, but Indian authorities had been exercising administrative control over all areas up to the international border shown on Indian maps. If the Chinese Government were at all serious about their claim to any of these areas, it would be expected that they would at least refer to their claims, if not discuss them. It is true that Premier Chou En-lai at the first meeting said that the relations between China and India were becoming closer every day and that from among the outstanding questions the two sides could settle questions which were ripe for settlement. The Indian Ambassador then pointed out that there were only small questions pending between India and China but he wished to see nothing big or small remaining out-standing between the two countries. Premier Chou En4ai replied that two large countries like India and China with a long common frontier were bound to have some questions, but all questions could be settled smoothly. In the context in which Premier Chou En-lai made this statement, it could hardly be inferred that he had in mind Chinese claims to vast tracts of territory which were shown as parts of India in Indian maps and were under Indian administration. At the meeting of January 8, 1954 the Vice-Foreign Minister of China stated that the negotiations between China' and India were to settle, in accordance with the Five Principles, those pending questions that were ripe for settlement. The Indian side accepted the principles as the basis for discussions. In his speech on April 29, 1954, after the signing of the Agreement, the leader of the Indian Delegation stated, "we have gone through fully questions that existed between our two countries in this (Tibetan) region", thus indicating that in the Indian view no dispute or question was left over. The Indian Delegation throughout took the line that all questions at issue between the two countries were being considered and, once the settlement was concluded, no question remained. In view of this the Chinese statement that Ambassador Raghavan agreed, in what is stated to be an informal talk, that the boundary question would not be discussed, is surprising.

21. In these circumstances the Government of India can only express their surprise at the contention of the Chinese Government that the question of the boundary between the two countries was not touched at all during the discussions leading to the 1954 Agreement. When Article 4, which specifies six passes in this area, was being discussed, the Chinese delegation brought forward a draft which stated that the Chinese Government "agrees to open" the passes. In other words, it was claimed that these passes belonged to China. This was contested by the Indian representative Mr. Kaul, who stated that they were Indian passes. It cannot, therefore, be asserted that the question of the ownership of these passes was not raised at all. The text as finally agreed upon was: "Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route". This could only be interpreted to mean that the use of these passes does not involve ownership because they are border passes.

22. The Chinese Government have also contended on a priori grounds that the boundary question could not have been discussed in 1954 because at that time "the question which the two countries were most concerned about and which called for urgent solution was the establishment of normal relations between India and the Tibet Region of China on a new basis". But surely normal relations between India and Tibet region of China could not have been established if the Chinese Government had in mind at that time claims to large areas of Indian territory contiguous to the Tibet Region. The Government of China were then fully aware of the alignment of the international boundary as shown on official Indian maps. They must also have been aware of the authoritative declaration made in 1950 by the Prime Minister of India on the subject of India's frontiers. Besides, the Government of China were aware that the Constitution of the Republic of India, adopted after lengthy discussions in open sessions of the Constituent Assembly, made specific mention in its Sixth Schedule of the Tribal areas of Assam and the North East Frontier Agency, which the Chinese Government now seek to claim as Chinese territory. In the 1954 Agreement the Chinese Government affirmed their respect for the territorial integrity of India. In the circumstances mentioned above they could not have done so, if they intended to raise a demand subsequently for large areas of Indian territory. Further, in discussions with the Prime Minister of India in 1954 and 1956-57, the Prime Minister of China did not give any indication whatsoever that his Government had large territorial claims, but, on the contrary, gave the impression that the revision of the maps was essentially a procedural issue, which would be made in due course. The conclusion is obvious that the Chinese Government have changed their position since 1954.

23. The Government of India cannot accept the contention that the area south of the traditional boundary east of Bhutan has always belonged to China and was until recently under Chinese jurisdiction. The territory was under the Varman, the Salastambha and the Pala dynasties till the 8th century, when they came under the pressure of the Ahoms, a branch of the Shan tribe. Finally, in the 13th century, an Ahom ruler gained control over the whole kingdom and gave the name Ahom, now softened to Assam, to the country. The Ahom rulers held sway in this area for nearly six centuries till they were finally displaced by the British authority in India in 1826. During the last years of Ahom rule control over the tribal peoples in the north weakened, but authority was re-established by the then Government of India over a period of years. At no time, however, was the sovereignty over these areas lost by the rulers of Assam or acquired by the Tibetans. The tribal areas south of the traditional watershed boundary have always been part of India.

24. In the 19th century the Government of British India asserted their authority over the tribes who acknowledged the right of that Government to maintain law and order in their areas. References to the territory of the British in the agreements concluded by the British Indian Government with the tribes meant merely that such territory was then under the direct administration of the British Government in India, as distinct from the tribal areas where they only exercised loose control. But at no time did these tribesmen cease to be under the central authority of the British Indian rulers.

25. The only evidence that the Chinese Government have brought forward to support their claim to jurisdiction over this area is with reference to Tawang and the Walong area. But Tawang and Walong form only a tiny fraction of the laree area now claimed by the Chinese Government, and the evidence brought forward in regard to these two localities has no relevance to the rest of the area. Even with regard to Tawang and Walong the arguments of the Chinese Government are untenable. Tawang was never a part of Tibet. The local administration of Tawang was in the hands of a Raja, who was assisted by Chhoryens, or headmen of groups of villagers, and Xachungs or village headmen. The only functions which the Lama hierarchy exercised in this area was ecclesiastical. In Tawang there is a large Tibetan monastery, whose Abbot and monks collected religious dues from the local inhabitants, who are Lamaists. Collection of such dues could not and did not confer any territorial sovereignty on the Tibetan authorities in respect of Tawang. This view is also supported by the statement made by the Chinese plenipotentiary at the Simla Conference in 1914. Ivan Chen stated on the 7th March 1914 that "what is paid to the Tibetans is not in the shape of revenue, in the ordinary sense of the word, but merely contributions to the monasteries. It is rather charity than a tax". And on 13th June 1914 Sun Pao-Chi, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed the British Minister in Peking that "the Tibetans affected to think that they had rights over all places inhabited by Lamaists, but this was not so. The Lamas might have ecclesiastical authority but this did not necessarily mean that these places belonged to Tibet".

26. Again, certain Tibetan families owned private estates south of the traditional boundary and collected rents. These rents cannot be regarded as Government taxes. It is possible that these rents were paid even after 1914, for the agreement between the Indian and the Tibetan representatives on the boundary safeguarded the rights of private estates.

27. The Chinese Government have quoted the agreement signed in 1853 between the British Indian authorities and the Monbas, and claimed that the Indian Government by this agreement recognised the Monbas as belonging to Tibet. Had this been so, it would be expected that the British Indian Government would have signed the agreement direct with Tibet. The Tibetan Government were, during these years, negotiating on their own, as is shown by their treaty with Nepal signed in 1856. In fact, the agreement of 1853 concerned one specific instance in which a Tibetan was involved, and the local Rajas appeared to be acting on this particular occasion for the Tibetan Government. Indeed, nine years earlier, in 1844, these Rajas accepted British authority in India by a written agreement. The key sentence of the 1844 Agreement reads as follows: "We also pledge ourselves to act up to any orders we may get from the British authorities."

28. The Walong area in the lower Lohit valley, which the Chinese Government refer to as Lower Tsayul, consists of a few villages inhabited by Mishmis and refugee Tibetans. The presence of the latter does not prove that this area belonged to Tibet. These refugees resisted the attempts of the Tibetan authorities to collect taxes.

29. It is incorrect to state that the authoritative maps published in India and China showed the boundary in this sector according to the alignment now being shown on Chinese maps. As already stated, the Postal Map of China published in 1917 should the boundary in consonance with the Indian alignment as shown in Indian maps. In November 1925 the University of Peking published a map showing the Frontiers of China at a time when China had expanded most, that is, in the days of the Ching dynasty before 1911. Even then the frontier east of Bhutan was shown approximately along the present alignment. As for official Indian maps, the Government of India have already drawn the attention of the Chinese Government to the Map of India published by the Survey of India in 1895, which showed the tribal area by a light orange colour wash. From 1938 to 1952 the Survey of India showed this boundary by an undemarcated symbol, because in fact the boundary had not been demarcated on the ground. As, however, the traditional boundary lay along a major watershed, the Government of India decided in 1954 that no demarcation on the ground was necessary. The undemarcated symbol was, therefore, omitted in subsequent maps.

30. The Government of China have mentioned in this connection the Map of India (1945) included in the third English edition of the book The Discovery of India by Mr. Nehru. The particular map Was a sketch map inserted by the publisher, and the author could not be held responsible for its inaccuracy. Nor should any adverse conclusion be drawn from it, so far as the Government of India are concerned.

31. The Government of India regret that the Chinese Government should persist in questioning the validity of the Agreement reached in 1914 between India and Tibet confirming the traditional boundary east of Bhutan. This was not the first time that Tibet conducted negotiations and concluded treaties, in her own right, with foreign states. On several occasions before 1914 Tibet had conducted negotiations and concluded treaties with other states. For example, Tibet concluded a treaty with Nepal in 1856 and another with Great Britain in 1904. These treaties were never objected to by China and were fully operative. At the Simla Conference, the Tibetan and Chinese plenipotentiaries met on an equal footing. This position was explicitly and unequivocally accepted by the Chinese Government. The three Plenipotentiaries exchanged copies of their credentials at the first session of the Conference on October 13, 1913. The credentials of the Tibetan representative issued by the Dalai Lama made it clear that Tibet was an equal party at the Conference with the right "to decide all matters that may be beneficial to Tibet", and the Chinese representative accepted the credentials of the Tibetan representative as being in order. The credentials of the British Indian representative, which were also accepted by the Chinese representative, confirmed that all the three representatives were of equal status, and that the Conference was meeting "to regulate the relations between the several Governments".

32. It is not true to say that the Agreement of March 1914 between India and Tibet about the Indo-Tibetan boundary was secret. It was an Agreement between the authorised representatives of the two parties, reached after full discussion, and approved by the Government of Tibet. There was, therefore, nothing clandestine about it. Moreover, the Indo-Tibetan boundary was delineated on the map appended to the Tripartite Convention, which was also signed by the Chinese representative on April 27, 1914. The 1914 boundary Agreement was published in the 1929 edition of Aitchison's Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, the previous edition having been published as early as 1909. The Chinese Government never protested against this Agreement. In fact, long before this Agreement the Government of British India had asserted their authority over these tribal areas, concluded Agreements with the tribes and created two Frontier Tracts comprising the entire territory. These facts were all well-known and neither the Tibetan nor the Chinese Government ever challenged the British Indian authority.

33. The Government of India cannot accept the contention of the Government of China that the Simla Conference only discussed the boundaries between Tibet and China and between Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet. It is also incorrect to say that the red line on the Convention Map which was signed by the Chinese representative represented only the boundary between Tibet and the rest of China, and that it was never stated that part of this red line was the boundary between China and India. The argument that the McMahon Line sector of the red line on the Convention Map represented the boundary between Tibet and China is fantastic. Article 9 of the Convention initialed by British Indian, Chinese and Tibetan plenipotentiaries, dealt with the boundaries of Tibet and the map attached to the Convention clearly showed Tibet's boundary with India. It is this boundary line which is known as the McMahon Line. The Postal Map of China published by the Chinese Government in 1917 showed this line as the boundary between India and Tibet, and marked the territory south of the line as India. By no stretch of imagination can it be contended now that any Chinese territory then lay south of the McMahon Line. The contention that the red line represents the boundary between Tibet and China is contradicted by the Chinese Government's own statement that jurisdiction had been exercised in the area south of the line by the Tibetan authorities and not by the Chinese Government.

34. It is strange that the Chinese Government should now seek to rely on the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, and argue that the 1914 Agreement was invalid as Britain was precluded by the 1907 Convention from having direct negotiations with Tibet. As China was not a party to the Convention between Britain and Russia, she cannot invoke that Treaty in support of her contention. In fact, throughout the negotiations, the Russian Government were kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations. A copy of the Agreement including the map was given to the Russian Government, who raised no objection to the negotiations and the subsequent Agreement.

35. The Chinese note refers to four protests made in 1946-47 by the Chinese Government. It may be stated that these protests related to acts of British Indian administration in a small area of the North-East Frontier Agency in 1943. The Government of India then replied that "the only activities in which the Government of India have been engaged in the area in question have been entirely restricted to the Indian side of the boundary between India and Tibet, which has been accepted for over 30 years". The protest of the Kuomintang Government of November 1949 merely stated that China had not signed the Simla Convention. No reply was sent to the protest as soon afterwards, in December 1949, the Government of India recognised the People's Government of China. A few months later, in August 1950, the Government of India mentioned in a note to the Government of China that the recognised frontier between Tibet and India should remain inviolate. The same year the Prime Minister of India declared publicly that India stood by the McMahon Line. There could, therefore, be no doubt about the Government of India's position in regard to the international boundary.

36. The Tibetans never protested against the Indo-Tibetan boundary as agreed upon in 1914. On more than one occasion, they acknowledged its existence and affirmed that they had no wish to dispute its validity. When the McMahon Line was verbally re-affirmed by the British Indian representative in 1936 and 1938, the Tibetan Government replied that they were fully aware of the terms of the 1914 Agreement. It is the Government of India which protested in 1943 against illegal penetration by the Tibetans into Indian territory. Similar protests were made by the Indian Government whenever the Tibetans sought to take advantage of Indian preoccupations in order to levy illegal dues in Indian territory. When the Government of India protested, the Tibetans withdrew. As for the fantastic Tibetan claims put forward in 1947, Prime Minister Nehru's letter of September 26, 1959 has adequately dealt with them.

37. The Chinese Government are aware of the special treaty relations which the Government of India have with Bhutan and Sikkim. In view of this the Government of India welcome the explanations given in the Chinese note relating to the boundaries between Sikkim and Bhutan On the one hand and Tibet on the other. The note states that the boundary between Sikkim and the Tibet region of China has long been formally delimited, and that there is neither any discrepancy on the maps nor any dispute in practice. The Government of India would like to add that this boundary has also been demarcated on the ground. As for Bhutan, its northern boundary is traditional and well-known. Adjoining it on the east is the North-East Frontier Agency of India, whose boundary with Tibet is both traditional and delineated by Agreement. It is not, therefore, possible for any Tibetan territory to lie south of the McMahon Line. The Government of India note with satisfaction that the Chinese Government have not repeated their map claims to any part of northern Bhutan. In view of the responsibility of the Government of India for the defense and maintenance of the integrity of Bhutan and Sikkim, the Government of India welcome the assurance of the Government of China that they will not encroach on the territory of Sikkim and Bhutan.

38. The foregoing paragraphs have set out in brief the points of substance regarding the Sino-Indian boundary question. The Government of India can only express their regret that the Chinese Government should have repeated their earlier versions of the incidents at Longju and at Kongka Pass in the Chang Chenmo Valley. The true facts regarding these incidents have already been communicated to the Chinese Government in the earlier Indian notes, and the various points raised in these notes still remain unanswered. It is only necessary to point out that if in fact the Chinese personnel entered Longju 5 days after the withdrawal of the Indian personnel, the Indian casualties cannot be explained. Similarly, the detailed account of Shri Karam Singh, which was handed to the Chinese Embassy in Delhi on November 24, 1959 disproves the Chinese Government's version of the incident at Kongka Pass. The Government of India have to state once more that these unfortunate incidents, involving severe casualties among Indian personnel, would not have occurred, if the Chinese troops had not intruded into Indian territory and taken offensive action against Indian police personnel engaged on routine patrol duty on Indian soil.

39. The Government of India share the sentiments of friendship expressed by the Chinese Government. Even before they attained independence, the people of India demonstrated in ample measure their friendship for the Chinese people. Since the achievement of independence by India this feeling of friendship has found expression in many concrete ways. The surprise and disappointment of the Indian people have therefore been all the greater at the challenge to the historic frontier of India by the Government of China. Recent developments have deeply disturbed the minds of the Indian people and created a feeling of uneasiness over the long frontier which for centuries had remained tranquil. In the interest of the two countries and of peace of the world, active steps must therefore be taken to remove the causes of the present tension and to establish a firm foundation of friendship between the two countries.

40. An essential first step is for the two Governments to agree on an arrangement without delay, which would completely eliminate the risk of border clashes and facilitate a friendly settlement of the disputes. In their latest note, the Chinese Government have repeated their earlier proposal that the armed forces of the two Governments should withdraw twenty kilometres or some other agreed distance from the border, and that the armed personnel of both sides should stop patrolling along the entire border. These suggestions have been discussed in detail in the Prime Minister of India's letter of November 16, 1959 to Premier Chou En-lai. The constructive proposals made by the Prime Minister of India in that letter are intended to secure the objective which both the Governments have in view. The Government of India would still hope that the Government of China would accept these proposals.

41. The Chinese Government have asked the Government of India to accept the position, as a preliminary to discussions, that "the entire boundary between the two countries has never been delimited and is therefore yet to be settled through negotiations". It is clearly impossible for the Government of India to accept this proposition which they consider unreasonable and against the facts of history, geography, custom, tradition and international agreements. The facts enumerated in the preceding paragraphs entirely disprove the Chinese Government's contention. The Government of India are anxious for a friendly settlement but they cannot possibly accept suggestions which gravely prejudice their basic position.

42. In his letter of November 16, 1959, to Premier Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister of India expressed his readiness to meet the Premier at a suitable time and place, but suggested that the immediate efforts of the two Governments should be concentrated on reaching an interim understanding, which would help in easing the present tension and prevent the situation worsening. Although no further border incidents have taken place in recent weeks, the urgent need for an interim understanding is paramount. The basic causes of tension and resentment remain. The Government of India are yet unable to understand why during the last year or so the long border which had remained tranquil through the centuries should have become a source of tension and anxiety. If there are any deeper reasons for this, they are unaware of them. Apart, therefore, from the boundary question, it is important, in the interest of both China and India and of world peace in general, that the two Governments should leave nothing undone, which could remove misunderstanding and restore the traditional friendship and cordiality between the two countries on a firm basis.

The Embassy takes this opportunity of renewing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Peking, the 12th February, 1960.

From: India Ministry of External Affairs. Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China, Nov. 1959-March 1960. White Paper No. III, 82-95.