Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 3 April 1960
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of India in China and has the honour to state as follows:
The Chinese Government has received the Embassy's note of February 12, 1960 and has made a careful study of it. The Indian Government has indicated in the note that in the interest of the two countries and of world peace, active steps must be taken to remove the causes of the present tension and to establish a firm foundation of friendship between the two countries, and held that the two Governments must agree on an arrangement without delay, which would completely eliminate the risk of border clashes and facilitate a friendly settlement of the disputes. This accords with the long-cherished desire of the Chinese Government, and the Chinese Government heartily welcomes it.
The Chinese Government, in its note of December 26, 1959 already gave a detailed and comprehensive account of the facts about the Sino-Indian boundary and its stand on this issue. The Indian Government has, in its note, stated many differing views. But the objections raised by the Indian Government in its note cannot dispute the facts presented in the above-mentioned Chinese note or shake the stand of the Chinese Government. Moreover, the Premiers of our two countries will soon meet in New Delhi. Therefore, the Chinese Government does not propose to answer the Indian Government's above-mentioned note point by point. The present note will only give some necessary explanations about those major questions and some of the facts on which the Indian Government expressed disagreement, as a supplement to the Chinese Government's note of December 26, 1959. Now as before, the Chinese Government clarifies these questions and facts, not for arguing purposes, but in hopes of promoting the understanding of the Indian Government and narrowing down the differences between the two sides, so as to facilitate the forthcoming meeting of the two Premiers.
For convenience sake, the terms of the western, middle and eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary, as defined in the note of December 26, 1959, will be used in this note.
I. Has the Sino-Indian Boundary been delimited and is there any need to delimit it formally?
(1) The Indian Government does not accept the conclusion that the entire Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited and that there is no boundary treaty or agreement between China and India. Yet it is unable to cite any fact to refute this conclusion. The Indian Government admits that the 1842 Treaty did not delimit the boundary in the western sector, yet it argues that this sector of the boundary was fixed from the 17th century onwards. However, it is still unable to cite any treaty basis for the delimitation of this sector of the boundary. With respect to the middle sector, the Indian Government admits that there exists no boundary treaty whatsoever. With respect to the eastern sector, the Indian Government can only cite the Simla Convention between Britain and the Tibet local authorities and the secret letters exchanged between them on the so-called McMahon Line in 1914. But the Chinese Government proved long ago that these documents are illegal and null and void, and that the Simla Conference did not discuss at all the question of delimiting the boundary between China and India. Judging from what has been said in the above, there is no gainsaying the fact that no boundary treaty or agreement exists between China and India, and that the entire Sino-Indian boundary has not been formally delimited.
(2) The Indian Government claims that the entire Sino-Indian boundary, as is well-known, runs along the main watersheds, and that according to international usage, a customary boundary which follows such unchanging natural features stands defined and does not require formal definition again by the two sides. This argument is unacceptable to the Chinese Government. Firstly, the Chinese Government proved long ago that the claim that the entire Sino-Indian traditional customary boundary follows well-known main watersheds is groundless. Secondly, according to internationally accepted principles, an international boundary signifies a demarcation line up to which neighbouring states exercise their sovereignty over their respective territories, and must be jointly defined by the states concerned. Therefore, even though some sections of the Sino-Indian traditional customary line may have comparatively distinct natural features, it is still necessary for the two sides to, define jointly their starting and terminal points and their specific alignments. Thirdly, even Britain never put forward the proposition that there was no need to formally define the Sino-Indian boundary. This is borne out by the following facts: In 1899 Britain proposed to define between Kashmir (including Ladakh) and with China the boundary Sinkiang. Between 1921. and 1927, it entered into talks with China for the delimitation of the boundary between Ladakh, and Tibet, talks which were not merely for the purpose of settling the ownership of a few pasture grounds, as alleged by the Indian Government. In 1914, it drew surreptitiously and unlawfully, with the Tibet local authorities, a so-called McMahon Line in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary. If there had been no need at all, to formally delimit the Sino-Indian boundary, as claimed by the Indian Government, why had Britain in the past asked again and again to delimit with China the various sections of the boundary between China and India? It can thus be seen that the assertion that there is no need to formally define the Sino-Indian boundary is untenable.
(3) Since the boundary between two neighbouring countries, according to. internationally accepted principles, has to be jointly defined by the two sides, any unilateral announcement by either side of its boundary line or change in the delineation of the boundary on maps in any manner obviously has no legal validity and is not binding on the neighbouring country concerned. Naturally, violation of the traditional customary line and expansion of extent of occupation by unilateral action all the more cannot constitute a legal basis for acquiring territory. The Chinese Government has always persisted in this stand on the Sino-Indian boundary question. The following may be recalled: Firstly, no Chinese Government has ever recognized Britain's territorial claims on the Tibet and Sinkiang regions of China; secondly, at the Simla Conference and afterwards, the Chinese Government explicitly declared its non-recognition of any treaty or similar document that might then or thereafter be signed between Britain and the Tibet local authorities; thirdly, the Chinese Government and the Tibet local authorities repeatedly lodged protests and made representations against Britain's past unlawful acts of violating the Sino-Indian traditional customary line and seizing Chinese territory; fourthly, since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Government has also clearly stated to the Indian Government that there exists between China and India the question of undelimited boundary and that China has always taken the stand of non-recognition of the so-called McMahon Line. These facts were set forth in detail in the Chinese Government's note of December 26, 1959. The Indian Government, however, repeatedly asserts that the Chinese Government has never raised any objection to the unilateral claims regarding the Sino-Indian boundary left over by Britain, that the Chinese Government has never protested against foreign encroachment on its territory, and that was not until September 1959 that the Chinese Government suddenly changed its stand on the Sino-Indian boundary question, and so forth. This is both surprising and incomprehensible to the Chinese Government.
(4) The Indian Government further contends that since neither side asked for a discussion of the boundary question in the 1954 Sino-Indian negotiations, it proves that no boundary question remained between them. This contention does not hold good, either. It is both illogical and inconceivable to argue that an outstanding issue will automatically cease to exist merely because it is not mentioned during certain negotiations. Moreover, the Chinese Government, from the very beginning of the negotiations, repeatedly made it clear that those negotiations were to settle those outstanding questions between the two countries that were ripe for settlement, and the Indian representative agreed to this. It can thus be seen that the 1954 negotiations did not solve, nor tried to solve, all the outstanding issues between the two countries. The assertion that, with the boundary question unsettled, normal relations between India and China's Tibet region could not have been established on a new basis is also untenable. By the establishment of normal relations between India and the Tibet region of China on a new basis is meant, chiefly that, following the liberation of China and the independence of India and the establishment of diplomatic relations between them, the state of affairs with India holding privileges in Tibet left over by Britain must be changed, and that Sino-Indian relations in China's Tibet region must be regulated in accordance with the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence. As for the question of undelimited boundary between the two countries, so long as both sides are willing to maintain the status quo of the border pending a settlement, it need not prevent the establishment of normal relations between them. There have been quite a number of cases like this in international relations.
(5) It can be seen from what has been said in the above that no boundary treaty or agreement has ever been concluded between China and India to formally delimit the boundary between the two countries. The Chinese Government is fully justified in maintaining that the two governments should conduct over-all negotiations and reach agreement on the boundary question. It is obviously incorrect to describe the Chinese Government's proposition as asking to reach a "new" boundary agreement to replace "old" ones, or to determine "afresh" the boundary between the two countries.
II. Individual Questions Concerning the Various Sectors of the Boundary
The Western Sector of the Boundary
(1) Facts about ownership and the exercise of jurisdiction. The Indian Government disagrees to the conclusion that the relevant area in the western sector of the boundary has always belonged to China and not to India, but it fails to produce any weighty piece of evidence to the contrary. In particular, the Indian Government has so far failed to give any explanation for the extraordinary thing that the Indian Government, which claims to have exercised jurisdiction and been sending personnel to carry out regular patrol in this area, should have for a long time been totally unaware of the fact that since 1950 Chinese personnel and supplies have been busily traveling between Sinkiang, and Tibet through this area, and a road has been built across it.
(2) Regarding maps. The Indian Government asserts that Chinese maps up to the twenties of the present century drew the boundary line in this sector more or less in consonance with that shown on current Indian maps, and that it is only since then that the delineation has been changed; it also asserts that Chinese maps of the 18th and 19th centuries showed clearly that Sinkiang never extended south of the Kuen Lun Mountains. These assertions are all groundless. The fact is that many Chinese maps and gazetteers published since the 18th century, particularly authoritative ones like the "To Cing Yi Tung Chih" of 1784 and the "Chia Ching Revised "Edition of the Ta Ching Yi Tung Chih" of 1820, clearly show that the limits of Sinkiang extend to the mountains south west of the source of the Karakash River, that is, the Karakoram Mountains. This is in the main consistent with the delineation of the boundary on current Chinese maps, and inconsistent with that on Indian maps. As for the "Postal Map of China" of 1917 referred to by the Indian Government, it was compiled arbitrarily by French and British imperialist elements, who then controlled China's postal service, without the consent of the Chinese authorities. The Indian people who, like the Chinese people, were subjected for a long time to colonial aggression should find it easy to understand that that map did not represent the view of the Chinese people, but only that of the imperialist elements.
The Indian Government asserts that the maps and records of the British surveyors and some of the travelers who visited this area in the 19th century are in consonance with the maps currently published in India. This is also at variance with the facts. As a matter of fact, the maps and records of these persons showed great inconsistency and confusion. This precisely bears out the historical fact that for a hundred years and more Britain kept surreptitiously altering the delineation of the boundary to encroach upon Sinkiang and Tibet. Nevertheless, some of these persons Still presented more or less accurately the actual state of the boundary. As the Chinese Government bas pointed out, John Walker as well as G. W. Hayward and Robert Shaw mentioned in Prime Minister Nehru's letter understood the boundary in a way approximating the traditional delineation on Chinese maps. Even the Indian Government is unable to deny this. Yet it repudiates their authority and asserts that only the reports of W. H. Johnson and the Second Yarkand Mission are authoritative. But this is also untenable. Take the case of Johnson as an example. There were even obvious mistakes in the topographical survey made by him, as pointed out in the book "Abode of Snow" written by K. Mason, Superintendent of the Survey of India, and published in 1955. Furthermore, without any ground, Johnson's map marked the Sino-Indian boundary line north of Shahidulla in Sinkiang, that is, about 150 kilometers deeper northward into Chinese territory than the line shown on current Indian maps, a delineation to which perhaps even the Indian Government would not agree.
The Middle Sector of the Boundary
The Indian Government has not advanced any new argument about the disputed places in this sector of the boundary. The Chinese Government would only make some additional remarks on the question of Puling-Sumdo. The Indian Government assert that Puling-Surrido and Pulamsumda are two different places, but Puling-Sumdo and Poling refer to one and the same place. This does not accord with the fact. The fact is that Puling-Sumdo is the same place generally known in India as Pularnsumda. It is, not hard to see that Pulamsumda is only a different pronunciation of Puling-Sumdo, whereas Poling is entirely another place and has never been called Puling-Sumdo at the same time. In the explanatory note attached to Prime Minister Nehru's letter of September 26, 1959, the Indian Government also explicitly admitted that Puling-Sumdo was none other than Pulamsumda under Indian control.
The Eastern Sector of the Boundary
(1) Historical facts about jurisdiction. The Indian Government indicates that it cannot accept the viewpoint that the entire area south of the so-called MacMahon Line comprising the three component parts of Monyul, Loyul and Lower Tsayul always belonged to China and was until recently still under Chinese jurisdiction. The Indian Government tries hard to prove that the entire area always belonged to India. But the reasons newly advanced by the Indian Government are all untenable too.
(A) Firstly, in the Monyul area, the Tibet local authorities not only exercised ecclesiastical authority, which was also admitted by the Indian Government, but what is more important, they also exercised administrative authority there. The Chinese Government has already cited many facts in this connection which are adequate proof. In addition, one can point to the fact that the British geographer Kingdom Ward, who had engaged in exploration in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, in his article "The Assam Himalaya: Travels in Balipara" published in the journal of the Royal Central Asia Society in 1938, while asserting groundlessly that the Monyul area including Tawang "was ceded to India" in 1913-14, could not but admit that not only had Monyul, and particularly Tawang, been "within the Tibetan administrative system" before then, but "the Tibetan administration carries on" even in 1938 when he arrived in Monyul. Secondly, the area of Lower Tsayul including Walong not only was inhabited by Tibetans, but was always under the jurisdiction of Tibet. British troops unlawfully invaded and occupied Walong in 1944, and it was only after the Tibet local government sent a representative of the Dzong pon of Sangacho Dzong to make representations that the British troops withdrew. As to the Loyul area which is situated between Monyul and Lower Tsayul, it is a well-established fact that the Tibet local government had established extensively administrative organs of various levels and collected taxes there.
(B) The Indian Government claims that far back in the period before the 8th century, the area south of the so-called McMahon Line was under the rule of the Varman, the Salastambha and the Pala dynasties and not under that of Tibet. But it fails to produce any factual basis. The allegation that the Ahom dynasty gained control over this area from the 13th century onwards is also not true. The rule of the Ahom dynasty extended only to the plains on the northern bank of the Brahmaputra River, and never to the southern foot of the Himalayas. It can be seen clearly from the first chapter and the attached map of the book "Anglo-Assamese Relations" published in 1949 by the Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies under the Government of Assam of India that the Himalayas and the areas at their foot inhabited by the Akas, Duflas, Abors and Mishmis were to the north of the bounds of Assam and not within them. As for the agreements concluded since the 19th century by Britain with certain tribes living in these areas, which were repeatedly referred to by the Indian Government, it is not difficult to see from their provisions that they were merely agreements on mutual non-aggression or the acceptance of British economic aid, and cannot be regarded as proof that these tribes were British or Indian subjects.
(2) Whether the so-called McMahon Line is legal. The Indian Government no longer stresses the assertion that the Simla Convention was binding on the Chinese Central Government. This is because the fact that the Chinese Central Government did not sign the Convention in the first place, and much less ratified it, can in no way be denied (although the Chinese representative Ivan Chen initialled the draft Convention, he stated that it was not a formal signature and that formal signing would have to be approved of by the Chinese Government, and the Chinese Government immediately declared the initialling to be invalid). The Indian Government, however, emphatically contends: (A) that the Simla Conference did discuss the so-called McMahon Line; and (B) that the Tibet local government had the right to conclude treaties on its own. The Chinese Government would like to further clarify these two questions.
(A) Article 9 of the Simla Convention did not touch on the Sino-Indian boundary, nor was the Sino-Indian boundary marked on the map attached to the Convention. This is all the more understandable when seen in relation to the following facts. Firstly, the Indian Government has all along been unable to point to any particular date of the Simla Conference or any particular page of proceedings of the conference when and where the question of the Sino-Indian boundary, and in particular that of the so-called McMahon Line, was discussed. It is obviously inconceivable that ownership of territory involving such a vast area could have been determined in a treaty and its attached map without any previous discussions. Secondly, the boundary line between China and India was not marked on the map attached to the Simla Convention. All the documents of the conference contained nothing in writing which could be used as a basis for interpreting a particular section of the red line shown on the map (which actually shows the boundary between Tibet and the rest of China as a section of the Sino-Indian boundary.
(B) It is absolutely indisputable that the Tibet local authorities had no right to enter into talks and conclude treaties, on its own, with foreign countries. Tibet is part of Chinese territory. China has full sovereignty over Tibet. Without the authorization and consent of the Chinese Central Government, the Tibet local authorities had no right to hold talks and conclude treaties with foreign countries; even if these were done, they were illegal and null and void. Even the British Government of the past dared not ignore this. A case in point is the British-Tibetan Convention of 1904 referred to by the Indian Government, which was imposed on the Tibet local authorities by Britain as the result of war. It may be recalled that, after compelling Tibet to sign this Convention, Britain still asked time and again the Chinese Government to sign and approve it. The question became a subject of repeated negotiations, and it was not until 1906 that it came to a close when another Convention was concluded between China and Britain and the above-mentioned British-Tibetan Convention was annexed to it. As for the secret letters regarding the so-called McMahon Line exchanged between the British representative and the representative of the Tibet local authorities at the time of the 1914 Simla Conference, they were exchanged behind the back of the Chinese Central Government and kept secret for a long time. Moreover, during the Simla Conference, the Chinese Government already made a general statement on its non-recognition of any treaty or similar document that might be signed between Britain and the Tibet local authorities. Those letters exchanged, therefore, are all the more illegal and null and void.
The Chinese Government hopes that the foregoing statement will help further clarify the following facts concerning the boundary, that is, the entire Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited, and the areas now disputed by the two sides have always belonged to China, not to India, with a considerable part of them remaining up to now under the effective control of the Chinese Government. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government would like to reiterate that it has always hoped to achieve a reasonable settlement of the boundary question through friendly consultations with the Indian Government, so that there will be no more dispute between the two sides on the boundary question. Some people seem to think that differences between China and India are almost impossible to solve. The Chinese Government disagrees to this view. The Chinese Government feels that, no matter how great the present difference between China and India on this particular question, it is after all an issue of limited and temporary nature compared with the fundamental need of the two peoples to maintain friendly co-operation for thousands and tens of thousands of years to come. Provided the two sides value the fundamental interests of friendship between the two countries and world peace, display good faith, adhere to friendly consultations and the Five Principles, and adopt an attitude of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, it is certainly possible to overcome all difficulties and bring about a settlement of the boundary question satisfactory to both sides. Although the Chinese Government has repeatedly set forth the facts about the boundary and its own stand, yet it has never set any pre-condition for the discussions between the two sides. The Chinese Government is willing, in the discussions, to explore together with Indian Government various avenues to a resolution of the differences with a conciliatory and reasonable attitude, and to try its best to promote the success of the discussions.
The Chinese Government has always advocated that, pending the settlement of the boundary question, both sides should maintain the present state of the border and preserve tranquillity along it, and see to it that this temporarily unsettled question do not affect the consolidation and development of friendly relations between the two countries. The Chinese Government has always been extremely careful on the Sino-Indian boundary question, and has never taken any step which might lead to clashes or tension on the border. For China the occurrence some time last year of tension and unfortunate incidents on the border of the two countries was totally unexpected, and China was utterly unprepared for it. After that, the Chinese Government promptly took measures and put forward proposals designed to ensure the tranquility of the border and prevent the use of force or the occurrence of clashes. In its note of February 12, 1960, the Indian Government likewise expressed the hope that the two Governments agree on an arrangement without delay to eliminate the risk of border clashes and facilitate a friendly settlement of the disputes. This is worthy of welcome. The Chinese Government hopes that the proposals put forward by Premier Chou En-lai An his letter of December 17, 1959 will be accepted by the Indian Government as the basis for such an agreement, because the above- mentioned proposals were worked out on the basis of full consideration of the previous proposals of the two sides. The Chinese Government further hopes that both sides will not stop at this step, but will jointly make further efforts to arrange for the overall settlement of the boundary question so that the peoples of the two countries will no longer be troubled and worried about the boundary question.
Thanks to the efforts of the Chinese and Indian Governments and peoples, the once strained relations between China and India have improved. This is reassuring and encouraging. Now, the eyes of the whole world are turning towards the forthcoming meeting of the Premiers of our two countries. The Chinese people, the Indian people as well as other people of the world who love peace and are concerned for Sino-Indian friendship all cherish fervent hopes for this meeting of historic significance. Indeed, the importance of this meeting and the weight of responsibility on the Governments of the two countries can in no way be overestimated. The Chinese Government hopes that both the Chinese and the Indian sides will be fully aware of this, and will do their utmost so as not to disappoint the hopes of our two peoples and of all those who are concerned for friendship between our two countries. Of course, the Chinese Government has by no means overlooked the fact that there remain difficulties on the way ahead, and that there are still some people in the world who, harbouring ulterior motives, are trying by all means to split and undermine the relations of our two countries and to prevent the success of the talks. The Chinese Government, however, firmly believes that so long as the two Governments display good faith towards -each other and endeavour to create conditions, they will certainly be able to bring about a speedy settlement of the boundary issue between the two countries, and the great friendship between the two countries not only will not be shaken, but will be further consolidated and developed.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the Republic of India in China the assurances of its highest consideration.
From: India. Ministry of External Affairs. Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged Between the Governments of India and China, Nov. 1959-March 1960. White Paper No. III. N.p., n.d., 8-16.