Kashmir Dispute: U.S. Chargé in India to U.S. Secretary of State, December 29, 1947
745.45F/12-2947 Telegram
The [US] Chargé in India (Donovan) to the [US] Secretary of State
SECRET - NEW DELHI, December 29,1947-4 p.m.
(1) I saw Baipai noon today and communicated to him [the] Department's regret breakdown [of the] Lahore talks. I outlined [the] Department's suggestions regarding settlement [of the] Kashmir problem under terms [of the] UN charter. Bajpai said he felt [the] GOI had taken all possible steps as provided by Article 33 [of the] LTN charter. He pointed out [the] GOI had endeavored [to] negotiate [the] Kashmir question with [the] GOP and it felt other means [of] settlement outlined [in] Article 33 [were] not feasible since tribesmen were in fact stateless persons as [the] GOP refused [to] accept responsibility [for] their entry [into] Kashmir.
(2) He said [a] joint approach by [the] GOI and GOP was impracticable since [the] GOP had consistently adopted [an] attitude it had nothing to do with raiders' activities.
(3) [The] GOI feels [the] question plebiscite must not be confused with problem[s] [of] cessation [of] hostilities and withdrawal of raiders. Therefore [the] GOI believes [the] Department's suggestion of requesting [the] Security Council [to] arrange impartial commission [to] hold [a] plebiscite [of] Kashmir would only lead to confusion [of] issues involved.
(4) [The] Embassy [is] certain [that the] GOI feels [the] only course practicable under [the] circumstances is [to] appeal [to] SC and request [the] SC [to] instruct Pakistan [to] prevent entry [of] raiders [of] Kashmir from Pakistan territory. [A] Note to [the] UN [is] already prepared and Bajpai thinks [it] will be sent today or tomorrow. He indicated [a] note to UN would state, unless Pakistan took measures [to] restrain entry [of] raiders [of] Kashmir and prevent use [of] Pakistan territory as base for raiders, GOI troops might be compelled [to] enter Pakistan. Entry [of] Indian troops [in] Pakistan, in [the] Embassy's opinion, could only result [in] open hostilities between [the] GOI and GOP. Cabinet meets 3 p.m. today when [a] final decision regarding appeal [to] UN will be taken. Bajpai will let me know immediately result [of] Cabinet meeting.
(5) Reasons [for the] breakdown [of] Lahore talks was [a] question [for] administration of Kashmir until holding of plebiscite. Pakistan felt if Sheikh Abdullah continued as head of emergency administration, he would be able, after imprisoning opposition [of] raiders, to obtain majority in favor of the administration and in favor of approval of accession of Kashmir to India. [The] GOI demanded raiders withdraw and that state remain under Abdullah's administration and then plebiscite be held.
(6) [The] Embassy [was] advised by UK High Commissioner's office that it has been informed [the] HMG believes [the] feeling [is] so strong between [the] GOI and GOP regarding [the] Kashmir issue, that recourse [of the] UN [is the] only feasible solution.
(7) Embassy's appraisal situation is as follows:
(a) GOP is in [a] very difficult
military position [in] Kashmir with little hope [of] success under present
conditions [of] supply and communications between India and Kashmir. [The] GOI
is deeply committed to support of Sheikh Abdullah and withdrawal from present
position [is] impossible from view [of] prestige. [The] GOP realizes [the]
difficulties [of] CTOI and will be correspondingly unyielding.
(b) [The] Embassy views [the]
situation with grave concern and can see no solution other than [an] appeal to
UN by GOI.
(c) Only hopeful indication is
Bajpai's statement to me that after withdrawal [of] raiders, [the] GOI will
abide by its previous statement agreeing to [a] plebiscite [of] Kashmir under
international auspices.
Sent Department 1162, repeated Karachi 104. Department please repeat London.
DONOVAN
From: US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947. Volume III. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972, 187-188.